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Introduction and Brief Historical
Background
The classification of economic fluctuations has
long been a subject of interest to economists.
A very considerable literature exists, dating well
back into the nineteenth century, concerning the
various kinds and types of business cycle phe-
nomena.1 That literature, moreover, is associ-
ated with some of the most widely known names
inall of economics—Mitchell, Burns, Kitchin,
Juglar, Kondratief, Kuznets, Schumpeter, Han-
sen, Haberler. Some of these names, in fact,
have come to be associated with certain specific
types of cyclical phenomena: Kitchin with the
short or inventory cycle; Juglar with the "regu-
lar"(e.g., approximately 7-year) trade cycle;
Kondratief, Kuznets, and Schumpeter with long
cycles (of 20 or 40 years or more).
Business cycle taxonomy was, of course,
basic to much early National Bureau research
and therefore to much of empirical research
in economics generally. Specifically, business
cycles, economic growth, and income distribu-
tion were essentially the three fundamental, and
A good concise bibliography of the more important
historical references can be found appended to Arthur
Burns, "The Nature and Causes of Business Cycles," orig-
inally published in the International Encyclopedia of the
Social Sciences, New York, Crowell-Collier and Macmil-
lan, Inc., 1968, Volume 2, pp. 226-245, and reprinted in
the Business Cycle in the Changing World, New York,
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1969, pp. 3-53.
A very extensive bibliography can be found in Alvin H.
Hansen, Business Cycles and National Income, New York,
Norton, 1964, pp. 699-710.
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about equally emphasized, elements in the early
National Bureau research program.
In its business cycle studies, the National Bu-
reau emphasis has been to a considerable ex-
tent on defining turning points; that is, so-called
"peaks" and "troughs" of the basic (Juglar)
trade cycle and the shorter inventory (Kitchin)
cycle. As one might expect, popular concern or
discussion has focused on the problems created
by the so-called recession or depression pe-
riods between peak and trough. These were,
and of course remain, the "infamous" shaded
areas in National Bureau time-series plots, or
for that matter, in plottings of economic time-
series commonly done by others, both in the
private and public domains.
Historical discussion of cyclical phenomena
has been very extensively concerned with the
manner in which an accumulation of individual
choices made by decentralized private decision-
makers in a market economy can give rise to
surges or contractions in total economic activity.
The key words were "accumulation" and "pri-
vate." In these early discussions, public policy,
if it entered at all, tended to be concentrated on
monetary considerations and, of course, mone-
tary policy has not always been primarily public
in character. Indeed, only in the twentieth cen-
tury did most market economy or Western
societies evolve the political accommodations
necessary to divide responsibility for monetary
policy between the private and public sectors.
In a sense, the advent of the "Keynesian policy
revolution" completed this evolution by empha-sizing the role of fiscal policy, which by defini-
tion is public in character. The very necessity
of its being public may, in fact, account for much
of the acrimony surrounding early discussion
and adoption of these policies.
The Keynesian revolution, anditsconse-
quences, has also led to a good deal of dis-
satisfaction with traditional ways of viewing and
classifying cyclical phenomena. Two important
changes in the empirical facts of cyclical be-
havior would seem to account for this change
in attitude, and both of these changes can be
deemed developments or even consequences
of Keynesian policies. The first of these is the
emergence of a systematic bias in public policy
toward achieving lower unemployment at the
expense of somewhat greater, and more per-
sistent, price inflation; that is, economic policy
in Western democracies seems to have been
increasingly dominated during the postwar pe-
riod by a willingness to sacrifice something in
the way of price stability to achieve lower unem-
ployment.2 The second new systematic empiri-
cal regularity to emerge in the "Keynesian policy
era" is that declines in absolute measures of
output have become increasingly rare in the
market economies of Europe, Japan and, to a
lesser degree, North America. It seems fair to
say that by the usual semantics no actual de-
pression has occurred in these economies in
the entire post-World War IIperiod and that
while there have been recessions, even these
have been few, short, and usually far between.
These empirical changes have not gone un-
noticed, of course, in the literature on business
cycle chronology. Perhaps the most "formal"
recognition of this awareness is the emergence
of so-called "growth" cycles in which a declin-
ing rate of growth, rather than an absolute
decline,3 defines a recession. Similarly, too, in
recognition of the systematic bias toward price
2 The existence of this bias was perhaps first noted and
commented upon systematically by Arthur Smithies, "Re-
flections on the Work and Influence of John Maynard
Keynes,"Quarterly JournalofEconomics (November
1951), pp. 578-601. The durability of this issue is perhaps
best attested by an elegant theoretical analysis of some
possible sources of the bias as developed by William
Nordhaus in a paper presented at the meeting of the
Econometrics Society in Toronto, Canada, December 1972.
IlseMintz, "Dating American Growth Cycles," The
Business Cycle Today, National Bureau of Economic Re-
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inflation, an increasing emphasis is to be found
in the taxonomic exercises on real rather than
monetary measures.4 Still another recognition
of these same facts has been the increasing
emphasis on the GNP gap—that is, the differ-
ence between potential and actual GNP—as an
important measure for setting government budg-
eting and stabilizationpolicies. Likewise, we
are becoming more sophisticated about our def-
initions and analyses of unemployment, recog-
nizing that the simple aggregate on national
unemployment may convey only a small portion
of the total information needed for policy pur-
poses; increasingly we wish detail on cycli-
cal,frictional, and structural components of
unemployment, hopefully classified by demo-
graphic and area characteristics as well.5
Of course, national income models, as these
emerged from the conjuncture of Keynes' theory
and the development of the essential accounting
by Kuznets, Jaszi, and others, have also had a
profound impact on how we study cyclical phe-
nomena. We have seen a shift from more ex-
ploratory and taxonomic investigations to the
testing of explicit hypotheses, as suggested by
theory. Large-scale econometric models of in-
ternational economies represent the fullest and
most recent expressions of this line of develop-
ment. Without wishing to resurrect the debates
of some two and one-half decades ago between
Burns, Mitchell, Vining, Koopmans, and others,
I would simply point out that these two channels
of development—one emphasizing the devel-
opment of behavioral hypotheses from empirical
observation and the other rigorous testing of
suggested hypotheses—tend to be complemen-
tary and necessary.6 But, whatever one's tastes
search, New York, 1972, pp. 39-88. (Also see her forthcom-
ing Dating U.S. Growth Cycles.)
Cf.Solomon Fabricant,"The Recession of1969—
1970," The Business Cycle Today, op. cit., pp. 89-136.
In this connection, David C. Hoaglin and Edwin Kuh,
of the National Bureau's Computer Research Center for
Economics and Management Science, have been explor-
ing the use of modern data analysis techniques to distin-
guish among the three conventional components of un-
employment—frictional, cyclical, and structural. A report
on their progress will be found in Part II, Section 6. 51m-
ilarly, Geoffrey Moore, in the following piece, suggests a
program of research on these and related matters.
Some empirical support for this observation might, in
fact, be derived from the work of Treyz, Su, and Haitovsky
on the testing of econometric forecasts, the report of which
will be published shortly by the National Bureau.or style in these methodological matters, the fact
remains that research and taxonomy in eco-
nomics do adjust to changing circumstances,
although sometimes with a considerable lag.
Alternative Business Cycle
Taxonomies
As an approach to the of cyclical
phenomena, both the shift in emphasis to real
values and the development of the growth cycle
concept are clearly improvements. Their utility,
moreover, is likely to be enhanced with the pas-
sage of time. Nevertheless, they may not have
met all the problems posed by the new depar-
tures in economic policy and cyclical behavior.
For example, modern discussions of the busi-
ness cycle, perhaps best illustrated in forecast-
ing exercises, increasingly stress the role of gov-
ernment in conditioning the course of events.
Forecasts today tend to be conditional on cer-
tain fiscal or monetary policy assumptions. Con-
comitantly, we hear less about the automatic
character of the cycle; that is, how the cycle
emerges from theinteractionor feedbacks
between private decisions and their conse-
quences. Private decisions are stillinvolved,
but the stress is on the ability, perhaps even
responsibility, of government to offset or neu-
tralize the more adverse consequences that
might emerge from these private decisions. In
short, the modern view tends to be that public
policy should not allow private decisions to ac-
cumulate into adversity. In a very real sense, the
cycle is less likely today to run its full course.
Recessions are not permitted to retrogress into
depressions. A full financial panic is, hopefully,
not needed to cure the excesses of inflation and
speculation.
In keeping with this new emphasis on the
public policy role in achieving stabilization and
growth objectives, one possible objective of
cycle taxonomy might be (and is in-
creasingly) on identifying or diagnosing the cur-
rent state of the economy. Indeed, the identifica-
tion of cyclical turning points ex post never was
all that overwhelmingly important from a policy
standpoint; rather, it was a device for facilitating
scientific and historical study of economic fluc-
tuations (e.g., improving the structural specifi-
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cation of an econometric model). The public,
however, always has been and remains under-
standably interested in the identification of turn-
ing points. If any proof of this point is required,
one can simply cite the National Bureau's ex-
periences in 1970 when the economy seemed
on the verge of or actually in an economic re-
cession as important congressional elections
drew near, Journalistic inquiries at the Bureau's
offices have never been more frequent in recent
years!
But even if,we recognize a policy interest in
cycle taxonomy, it is not clear that the current
classification procedures are necessarily the
best.If policy is uppermost in mind, then we
should attempt toidentify the 'pathological
condition" or state of the economy at different
points in time and as recently as possible. (This
"currency" aspect has, of course, long been
recognized in Bureau research on "indicators.")
It seems highly probable, moreover, that policy-
makers will want to know more than if the econ-
omy is simply in a state of expansion or contrac-
tion.7 Furthermore, we should recognize that
cycle taxonomy, like so many classifications of
social phenomena, may not be distinct (that is,
"either-or"). It is as likely that the economy may
simply "glide" from one stage of the cycle to
another as to make an abrupt transition.8 Ac-
cordingly, in the diagnosis of the cyclical state
at any point in time, the actuality may represent
a considerable mix of different forces,influ-
ences, or conditions.
Nevertheless, conceptual clarity,ifnothing
else, suggests that we try to define certain
circumstances or models ofrelatively "pure
stages" of the cyclical condition. In fact, a "four-
stage taxonomy" would seem to be identifiable
(or at least implicit) in much, if not most, of cur-
rent forecasting and cycle discussions. These
four cyclical states might be defined to a first
7 Indeed, such an emphasis isimplicit,ifnot explicit,
in much earlier Bureau work on business cycle phenom-
ena: Burns and Mitchell's multiple (e.g., nine) stage par-
tition of the basic cycle and their emphasis on the dif-
ferences thatexist between early and latestages of
expansion and contraction; Ruth Mack's subcycles; and
the use of diffusion indexes.
8 Again, a gliding or phased transition would seem to
be more consistent with the Burns and Mitchell emphasis
on the evolutionary, constantly evolving character of busi-
ness cycle phenomena.approximation (and in their expected sequence
starting from a recession) as follows:
1Recession—considered(forthe United
States economy at least) to be more or less
consonant with current National Bureau defini-
tions; that is, a period in which total aggregate
activity actually declines somewhat from pre-
vious peak levels.
2. Recovery—defined as the early expansion
out of a recession and a state of economic af-
fairs in which virtually everything is "going well"
—unemployment is declining, prices are rela-
tively stable, productivity is rising, and total out-
put is expanding.
3.Demand-Pu/i Inflation—equatedtothe
classic inflation situationin which "too much
money chases too few goods"; that is, the forces
of recovery are allowed somehow to achieve too
much force with production forced up to capac-
ity constraints, prices rising, rates of produc-
tivity improvement declining, and so on.
4. Stagflation—defined as a mix of stagnation
at a high level of activity and inflation;i.e., a
situation in which capacity utilization drops off
from the strains of demand-pull, unemployment
may begin to rise, and total monetary expansion
diminishes but prices and wages nevertheless
continue to increase (perhaps because produc-
tivity ceases to improve rapidly or for other yet
to be defined reasons).
It doesn't require too much perception or in-
sight to identify this cyclical phasing, at least
impUcitly, in many current forecasting discus-
sions. Only the "stagflation" stage is likely to
elicit much debate or argument. Even then the
issue is not so much whether some separably
definable stage sometimes does exist after the
demand-pull and before therecession,but
rather how to describe it, and particularly how
to label its causes. Thus in many discussions it
would be called "cost-push" inflation. Others,
though, would insist that such a cost-push is
simply a "winding down" of classical inflation,9
This, in turn, leads to a policy debate about
whether stagflation or cost-push is an entirely
different breed of economic condition requiring
This is the view favored by Phillip a result
of a National Bureau study he now has underway of price
behavior in the U.S. economy in the 1950s and 1960s. See
his progress report on this research in Part II, Section 1.
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new and different policies, such as incomes
policy and price controls. In the best (or at least
oldest and, hopefully, "tried and true") National
Bureau tradition, no position will be adopted on
these policy issues here; rather, the focus is on
whether real empirical delineations correspond-
ing to this four-stage scheme can be identified
in the economy. The obvious time period to test
first for such phenomena is post-World War II,
or that period roughly corresponding to the new
cyclical circumstances.
Some Empirical Evidence on a
Four-Stage Cyclical Taxonomy
From an empirical standpoint, a four-stage tax-
onomy can be investigated as a reasonably
straightforward problem in multivariate discrim-
inant analysis. The basic objective of discrim-
inant analysis is to classify an observation (for
which the defining characteristic is not available
or observable) into one of several groups on
the basis of available data or variables. Strictly
speaking, the definitionof the classification
function or procedure should be based on sam-
ple observations for which the correct classifica-
tion has been established: that is, for which we
know the basic defining characteristic. Clearly,
a useful independent variable for performing
a classification under these circumstances is
one for which the average value in the different
groups is substantially different. Conversely, if
the values or average for a variable were essen-
tially the same inall groups, such a variable
would be of little use for classification purposes.
Graphicalty we might portray the situation as
shown in Figure I-i. In this graph four hypothet-
ical distributions corresponding to recession, re-
covery, stagflation, and demand-pull are shown
with different central tendencies or mean values
for price increase and growth rate characteris-
tics. As drawn, stagflation is a situation charac-
terized by price increases but low growth, re-
cession as a period in which both growth and
price increases are tow, demand-pull as a situa-
tion in which both are high, and recovery as a
period that combines low price increases with
high growth rates. (Again, it should be stressed
that at this point the example is strictly hypo-
thetical and iltustrativet) An obvious next stepFigure I-i
in any classification exercise would be to draw
lines on the graph that divided the space into
four regions that hopefully corresponded rea-
sonably well to the underlying groups. Lines A
and B in the graph illustrate such possibilities.
Thus, if we obtained results like those shown in
the graph for our sample observations about
which we knew the defining characteristics, we
would then have a basis for classifying new
observations for which the defining characteris-
tic was not evident. Specifically, if a new obser-
vation had values that fell in the northeast quad-
rant, as formed by the lines A and B, we would
classify it as demand-pull, whereas the south-
west quadrant observation would be character-
ized as recession, a northwest as stagflation,
and a southeast as recovery. That is, you could
simply classify any new observation for which
the defining characteristic is not known into its
most likely group according to the quadrant
or region into which itfell, these quadrants or
regions being determined by the original analy-
sis. In essence, discriminant analysis is nothing
more than simply applying these basic notions
more strictly or formally, arid often with many
more dimensions or variables.
From a strictly formal standpoint, unfortu-
nately, we really do not know precisely to which
months or periods our four stages or classifica-
tions might apply. For the United States, though,
it is not too difficult to approximate such a four-
way cyclical classification for the postwar pe-
riod. One can start with existing National Bureau
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definitions for recessions; these block out (de-
line) five segments in the postwar period: No-
vember 1948 to October 1949, July 1953 to
August1954, July 1957 to April 1958, May 1960
to February 1961, and November 1969 to No-
vember 1970. For the other stages, a bit of com-
mon sense, reinforced by some knowledge of
recent business cycle history, can carry the
analysis a considerable distance. For example,
the onset of demand-pull inflation is commonly
associated both with the middle or third quarter
of 1950 because of the Korean War and with
mid-1965 because of the Viet Nam buildup that
escalated sharply starting in July of that year.
With somewhat less certainty, the second half
of 1955 and all of 1956 might be termed as a
period of demand-pull inflation; perhaps, too,
some of early 1957 might be so characterized.
It is more difficult to specify any period between
the trough of 1958 and peak of mid-1960 as a
demand-pull, but if it happened it was probably
in 1959. By a process of elimination, recoveries
have to be periods that occur before these
demand-pull periods but after the preceding re-
cessions; and stagflations must occur, if at all,
after demand-pulls but before the next reces-
sion. The a priori classification of periods that
Iand a young researcher, Daniel Weinberg,
worked out through such considerationsis
shown in Table I-I.
We have also tested these classifications ex-
perimentally using discriminant analysis. On the
whole, our impressionistic or prior classifica-
tions stood up remarkably well to the discrimi-
nant tests or classifications. The only major
instanceinwhich the apriorispecification
seemed to failtotally was in the years
through 1960. In that period the economy ap-
pears to have moved from recession to recovery
to recession without passing through either a
demand-pull or cost-push stage or any other
type of major inflationary experience. But, as
already mentioned, even this was not totally un-
expected. Moreover, there is no reason why all
four stages must occur. The 're-entry" problem,
in fact, can be characterized as 'figuring out'
how to make the transition from demand-pull
back to recovery without experiencing recession
(a trick that our results suggest has not been
achieved in the United States since 1947). Simi-
Growth roteTABLE I-i
Preliminary (a priori) Classification of Post-World War II
U.S. Business Cycles Into a Four-Stage Scheme
Starting Dates for
Recession Recovery Demand-Pull Stagflation
November 1948 November 1949 June 1950 March 1951
July 1953 September 1954 February 1956 October 1956
July 1957 May 1958 January 1959 (?) January 1960 (?)
May 1960 March 1961 September 1965 January 1969
November 1969 December 1970 —
larly, there is nothing inevitable about applying
so much stimulus that all recoveries must end
in demand-pull inflations.
After some experimentation and modification,
our discriminant analyses (which we hope to
report more fully in a forthcoming National Bu-
reaupublication)identifiedordifferentiated
between two essentially complete four-stage
cycles in the postwar period: 1949 through 1953
and 1960 through 1970. In addition, the period
from 1953 to 1958 could be defined as either
a four-stage cycle, in which the fourth, stagfla-
tion or cost-push, stage was extremely abbrevi-
ated, or as a three-stage cycle, in which the
cost-push phase is totally eliminated. We incline
toward the three-stage rather than the four-
stage characterization for these years and tenta-
tively have adopteditfor subsequent work.
Finally, there was the one truncated or two-
stage cycle from 1958 through1960.Our
complete chronology for the period from 1949
through March 1972 (the last date for which we
had adequate data when we started our analy-
ses) can be found in Table 1-2.
The variables used for carrying out the classi-
fication scheme were suggested by the policy
and historical considerations already discussed.
A listing of them, along with their average values.
for the stages defined in Table 1-2, can be found
in Table -3. These averages more or less con-
form with prior expectations about the differ-
ences in the different cyclical stages. Prices
and labor costs rise less rapidly on average in
recession and recovery than in either of the in-
flationary periods. On the other hand, recovery
and demand-pull are the periods in which the
economy expands and grows more rapidly,
whereas recession and stagflation are charac-
terized by relative stagnation or even actual
decline. Stagflation or cost-push also seems to
be a period in which leading indications of in-
cipient recession appear: rates of increase in
TABLE 1-2
Final Classification of U.S. Business Cycles Into a Four-Stage Scheme
(December 1948 through March 1972)
Starting Dates for
Recession Recovery Demand-Pull Stagflation
December 1948* November 1949 August 1950 May 1951
December 1953 August 1954 February 1955 —
September1957 June 1958 — —
March 1960 Februaryl96l July1965 January1969
February 1970 December 1970 ? ?
* November 1948, classified initially as a recession month following the standard National Bureau chronol-
ogy, was designated as demand-pull by the discriminant analyses.
6TABLE 1-3
Average Value of Variables in Four Stages
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a. Q indicates a variable available on a quarterly
Variables available from source only on a quarterly
basis for the discriminant analyses.
b. Seasonally adjusted annual rate.
basis; M indicates a variable available
basis (a) were interpolated so as to be
on a monthly basis.
placed on a monthly
New York Stock Exchange prices begin to de-
cline even as output continues to grow, and
rates of increase in wholesale prices turn nega-
tive although consumer prices continue upward
ata vigorous rate.1° In essence, the discriminant
function is created by attaching different weights
10 The difference in the signs associated with the aver-
age values of the stock price change variable in cost-push
and demand-pull inflations may have some relevance to
the continuing debate about whether inflation is'bullish"
or "bearish" for the stock market. Specifically, both posi-
lions may be correct. The bullish hypothesis during early
or demand-pull inflation and the bearish during late or
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to these different variables so as to maximize
the differences in the groups weighted mean
differences (i.e., in the groups' mean discrimi-
nant scores). On a conventional F-test, these
mean discriminant scores are significantly dif-
ferent for the different groups: As might be ex-
pected, the two inflation periods are the least
differentiated, but even their F-test is at a level
three times the F-value associated with1per
cost-push stages. For a provocative and thorough discus-
sion of these issues see the report by John Lintner that
follows Moore's report in this section.
Demand- Stag- Average, Avail-
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Recession Recovery Demand-Pull Stagflation
'4702 Demand-Pull 0.001 0.003 0.995 0.000
03 Demand-Pull 0.131 0.145 0.715 0.009
04 Recovery 0.003 0.927 0.071 0.000
05 Demand-Pull 0.104 0.006 0.888 0.002
06 Demand-Pull 0.010 0.000 0.982 0.008
07 Demand-Pull 0.002 0.000 0.984 0.015
08 Demand-Pull 0.007 0.001 0.988 0.003
09 Demand-Pull 0.001 0.004 0.984 0.011
10 Demand-Pull 0.000 0.000 0.999 0.000
11 Demand-Pull 0.000 0.001 0.999 0.001
12 Demand-Pull 0.000 0.000 0.997 0.003
'48 01 Demand-Pull 0.000 0.000 0.989 0.011
02 Demand-Pull 0.028 0.029 0.943 0.000
03 Demand-Pull 0.013 0.002 0.984 0.001
04 Demand-Pull 0.008 0.001 0.956 0.035
05 Demand-Pull 0.000 0.000 0.951 0.049
06 Demand-Pull 0.000 0.000 0.977 0.023
07 Demand-Pull 0.000 0.000 0.866 0.134
08 Demand-Pull 0.000 0.000 0.962 0.038
09 Demand-Pull 0.000 0.001 0.827 0.172
10 Demand-Pull 0.000 0.001 0.703 0.295
11* Demand-Pull 0.277 0.039 0.583 0.102
'7204 Recovery 0.000 0.999 0.001 0.000
05 Recovery 0.024 0.976 0.000 0.000
06 Recovery 0.002 0.998 0.000 0.000
07 Recovery 0.006 0.094 0.000 0.000
08 Recovery 0.051 0.941 0.008 0.000
09 Recovery 0.005 0.912 0.083 0.000
10 Recovery 0.000 0.996 0.004 0.000
11 Recovery 0.004 0.657 0.338 0.001
12 Recovery 0.010 0.965 0.024 0.000
* November and December 1948 were classified as demand-pull by the discriminant analysis, although
originally (see a priori classification in Table I-i) identified as recession months following the National Bureau's
previous definitions of turning points.
tiori and recovery, on the other hand, are the
most sharply delineated periods.
The basic discriminant analysis was Bayesian,
using equal or diffuse priorities. Using the dis-
criminant analyses, a chronological classifica-
tioriof the entire postwar period, month by
month from late 1948 through early 1972, can
be derived and wiJI be included in the final re-
9.29875 port of our study. To anticipate just a bit, the
cent significance for such a sample.'1 Stagfla-
11 One per cent significance would be associated with
an F-value of approximately 2.78. The matrix of F-values
for testing the differencesinthe average discriminant










8most remarkable result seemingly suggested by
the posterior discriminant probabilitiesis the
strong dominance of one parilcular classifica-
lion for almost every monthly observation. This
holds true even near the end of one cyclical
phase and during the transition into the next,
although there is usually some slight advance
indication of an impending transition. In short,
and in spite of the comments just made about
the probable difficultiesof making clear-cut
classifications of cyclical status, our preliminary
analyses seem to indicate that clear-cut classi-
fication is possible.
An interesting test of the basic discriminant
concept is provided by extrapolating our analy-
ses to periods beyond the historical data on
which the original functional parameters were
estimated; that is, to periods before November
1948 and after March 1972. The results of such
extrapolations are shown in Table 1-4. Again,
there seems to be considerable agreement with
the basic scheme. The year 1948 and the last
part of 1947, for example, were mainly charac-
terized by demand-pull and cost-push inflation.
In the projection to late 1972, the recovery of
1971 is continued throughout most of the year
but with some signs of incipient inflation appear-
ing as the year proceeded. A summary of such
results is shown in Table 1-5.
Two canonical functions seem to be quite suf-
ficient to perform the basic discrimination (as
shown by the eigenvalues and the cumulative
TABLE 1-5
Summary Table of Canonical Discriminant Analysis Results







1 Unemployment Rate 292.8347 1 .77630 0.06440
2 % A Real GNP (1958 dollars)* 46.0021 —0.35772 0.41 356
3 %Unit labor cost* 9.3395 0.14937 0.41 282
4 % A Money GNP* 7.4153 0.33239 —0.17561
5 % A Gross gov't. exp.* 9.0361 —0.01 895 —0.00618
6 % A Prime r 8.8451 —0.06426 3.10785
7 % A 5.5809 0.1 3042 0.1 4026
8 % A M-1 * 13.4650 —0.09056 —0.10308
9 A Gov't. surplus as % of GNP 5.6508 0.26277 0.08890
10 % A NYSE prices 4.1029 —0.07770 0.03947
11 A Average corporate r 3.7977 —1.09176 —2.09874
12 % ACPI* 1.1675 —0.00042 —0.00259
13 % A GNP price DEFL* 0.7048 —0.35973 0.09352
14 % A Output per man-hour 0.4204 0.1 9864 0.23696
15 % AWPI* 0.3459 —0.01065 —0.01534
16 % A Compensation per man-hour 1.6845 —0.21 773 —0,24380
Eigenvalues Associated with Canonical Variates
First Second Third Fourth
4.31646 0.99771 0.25089 0.00003
Cumulative Proportion of Total Dispersion Accounted for by Canonical
First Second Third Fourth
Variables
0.77564 0.95492 1.00000 1.00000
Notation:
A = Change (month to month or quarter to quarter) in denoted variable.
= Percentage.
* Seasonally adjusted annual rate.
9proportions of "explained" dispersion as shown
at the bottom of Table 1-5). Moreover, the func-
tions can be interpreted reasonably straightfor-
wardly looking at the weights 'or coefficients
shown in the right-hand columns of the table.
The first function apparently differentiates by
price behavior; that is,it separates recession
and recovery from inflation periods. The second
canonical function apparently differentiates by
basic growth or expansion characteristics; that
is,it separates the "real growth" stages, recov-
ery and demand-pull, from the no-growth or
monetary-only growth periods, recession and
stagflation. This can be shown graphically by
plotting the canonical variates of the different
monthly observations, as shown in Figure 1-2.
The first canonical is plotted against the horizon-
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M Group mean
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5axis. Thus, against the vertical axis (stagfiation
and recession), the slow-growth periods, will be
in the upper half. For the first canonical plotted
on the horizontal axis, the relatively price-stable
periods of recession and recovery are on the
right-hand side of the diagram, whereas the two
inflationary periods are to the left.
One clear deficiency in the present scheme,
especially for policy purposes, is our use of
quarterly variables that will be available only
after a time lag. Policy-making is perhaps facili-
tated if the state of the economy can be evalu-
ated more contemporaneously or currently; e.g.,
on the basis of variables that are available with
only a short time lag after the end of each month.
With that goal in mind, Weinberg andIhave
tested our classification scheme using only the
monthly variables employed in our original clas-
sification exercise and variables (as suggested
by lisa Mintz' growth cycle study) that are avail-
able no later than a month and one-half after
the end of each month. On the basis of these
criteria, we were able to retain eight of our origi-
nal sixteen variables (specifically, all the vari-
ables marked with an M in the final or "avail-
ability" column in Table 1-3) and added ten more
variables (from Mintz' list of eighteen). This set
of variables we chose to call our "policy analy-
sis" variables. To these variables, we then
applied exactly the same discriminant analysis
TABLE 1-6
Average Values of Variables for the Four Cyclical Stages






Unemployment rate* 5.56733 5.75899 3.95607 3.1 5000 4.78747
Percentage change
Industrial production index —9.10855 10.31 529 5.53147 1.47929 4.12663
Personal income* 0.391 81 7.15738 8.43166 5.96562 6.15931
Retail sales* —0.03468 8.25472 4.40413 3.44946 4.921 29
Percentage change
Man-hours in non-agricultural
establishments* —4.59373 3.70242 3.22986. 1.14246 1.70992
Employees in non-agricultural
establishments* —3.56501 3.33779 3.71563 1 .77356 1.99464
Persons in non-agricultural activities* —0.98702 2.57909 2.57909 1.51123 1.81321
Mining, manufacturing, construction •
Wages and salaries* —8.00613 8.92445 8.97421 5.45598 5.43112
Change per month
Treasury bill rate —0.15202 0.03359 0.05611 0.04330 0.00923
Treasury bond rate —0.04184 0.01 029 0.03280 0.03409 0.01150
Prime rate —0.15653 0.02638 0.06061 0.06114 0.00986
Corporate bond rate —0.01469 0.001 52 0.04378 0.041 59 0.01621
Percentage change in
Consumer price index 1.48290 1.44321 3.56626 2.80924 2.28657
Wholesale price index —0.82736 1.36362 3.80265 —0.10441 1.46380
Indus. commodities* —0.91 752 1.50932 4.13841 0.51623 1.69746
NYSE composite price index 0.21 583 1.02801 0,87376 —0.33689 0.62622
Percentage change
lriMl 1.12979 3.58940 3.65328 3.51795 3.16645
In M2 4.52061 6.67328 5.49375 2.89295 5.35707
* Seasonally adjusted annual rate.
11ilarly, eight fewer months of the recovery group
are classified correctly, with four of these mis-
classifications showing up as recession and four
as demand-pull. On the other hand, the policy
analysis using the monthly variables is correct
in one more demand-pull case than the original
analysis and is wrong only in one more stagfla-
tion month. Somewhat paradoxically, however,
when we test the policy analysis by backcasting
and forecasting, it is not so obvious that the in-
flation classifications are performed any better
than the recession or recovery classifications.
Specifically, when using the monthly data only,
the period between February and October 1948
is not so uniformly predicted as demand-pull
using the monthly data as in the original
sis. However, when the monthly analysis is ex-
trapolated to the period after April 1972, recov-
eries are predicted using the monthly data, just
as they were when using the original quarterly
and monthly variables. The potential usefulness
of the policy analysis emerges, however, when
one realizes that one can compile a quite current
classification using the monthly data. On this
basis, we find that January and February of
1973 can be classified as recovery periods, but
with some probability of demand-pull beginning
to emerge. January and February 1973 could
not, of course, be classified as yet if we still re-
lied on our quarterly data, since many of the first
quarter numbers for 1973 are not yet available
(werenot" at the time this paper was pre-
sented to the National Bureau's Board in mid-
73 April) even on a preliminary basis.
2 42 Obviously, these experiments with monthly
data might have some implications for the de-
velopment of leading indicators or other early
warning mechanisms on which to base public
policy decisions.It would be much too early,
however, to make this claim. At this very pre-
liminary stage of our investigation, we would be
content merely to say that our exploration of
these possibilities provides some promising but
still ambiguous results. Moreover, the general
utility for policy purposes of taxonomic devices
such as these, compared to other forecasting
and diagnostic techniques (such as economet-
ric models), is at least debatable, although it
would appear that the new techniques might
have some role to play.
techniques we had used before.
A listing of these eighteen variables, along
with their average values for the different groups
—recession, recovery, demand-pull, and stag-
flation—are shown in Table 1-6. The mean values
for the different cyclical stages or 'groups be-
have much as those reported in Table 1-3. Again,
we find that the two inflation periods are asso-
ciated with more rapid or pronounced price in-
creases than either recession or recovery. On
the other hand, the two growth periods, recovery
and demand-pull inflation, are more strongly
associated with increases in output than the
two more stagnant periods of recession and
stagflation.
The discriminant classifications using the pol-
icy analysis set of variables are slightly worse
for recessions and recoveries but not for the
inflation periods. The point is illustrated by a
comparison of the classification performance
of the two analyses, as shown in Table 1-7. Spe-
TABLE 1-7
Number of Cases Classified into Groups
I.
Original









II. "Policy Analysis" Using Monthly Data Only





Recession 37 9 3 0
Recovery 7 94 4 0
Demand-Pull 1 0 74 7
Stagflation 0 0 3 41
cifically, using the monthly or policy analysis
variables, seven fewer recession months are
classified correctly, with five of these showing
up as recoveries and two as demand-pull. Sim-
12Summary and Conclusions
As in most aspects of economic affairs, the
cyclical behavior of economies is constantly
evolving and changing. The National Bureau,
which has pioneered so much study of cyclical
phenomena, has been adjustingitsresearch
program accordingly. Perhaps the two most dra-
matic of these new initiatives have been adjust-
ments made in the Bureau's approach to busi-
ness cycle taxonomy: an increasing emphasis
on real(instead of monetary) measures and
experimentation with a new cycle concept, the
growth cycle.
The test of new ideas, however, need notstop
there and, of course, will not. At the Bureau we
have also undertaken other new initiatives in
the study of the cycle. Thus, there are studies
underway at the Bureau's Cambridge Computer
Center and proposed new investigations by
Geoffrey Moore that could have substantial im-
plications for business cycle studies in the fu-
ture.In this report, for illustrative purposes, I
have dwelt mainly on one, very experimental,
initiative: specifically, an attempt to define a
four-stage cycle for the U.S. postwar economy,
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following definitions that seem more consistent
with current convention and usage. This four-
stage classification scheme, when applied to
post-World War II economic fluctuations in the
U.S., appears to work reasonably well.It con-
forms to "folk wisdom" and seems to be em-
pirically definable.
Needless to say, before any such four-stage
scheme should be widely accepted,it would
need extensive testing and elaboration. For ex-
ample, in keeping with the previous speculation
about the complementarity of taxonomic exer-
cises with attempts to improve structural speci-
fication, one might explore whether distinctly
different relationships (as, for example, in regres-
sion or econometric parameter estimates) are
apparent in different cycles or at different stages
of various cycles; indeed, Weinberg and I have
such investigations underway and will include
them in our final report on this work. But at this
point, no more should be claimed than that the
potential seems to be there: namely, that a fresh
approach to the entire question of cycle taxon-
omy might help illuminate the 'new realities"
of the business cycle as these have emerged
from the policy revolution of recent years.NEW WORK ON BUSINESS CYCLES
GEOFFREY H. MOORE
When I returned to the National Bureau in Feb-
ruary 1973, 1found a thriving interest in two
subjects thatIhad been concerned with when
Ileft 4 years ago; namely, business cycle chro-
nologies and economic indicators. use Mintz
has constructed a "growth cycle" chronology
for the United States. Her manuscript, Dating
U.S. Growth Cycles, which describes and ana-
lyzes the chronology, is being readied for pub-
lication. John Meyer and Daniel Weinberg have
been experimenting with another form of chro-
nology, one that recognizes not only recessions
and recoveries but also "demand-pull" and
"stagftation" stages of economic expansions.
This interest dovetails with one that I am plan-
ning to pursue: developing a chronology for the
rate of inflation in the United States that will
distinguish historical periods of high and/or
rising rates of inflation and intervening periods
of low and/or declining rates. It will be a further
development of the "rate of inflation" chronol-
ogy used in my 1970 paper for the 'National
Bureau's colloquium on The Business Cycle
Today. With the current and continuing interest
in the rate of inflation,it would appear worth-
while to give the subject a more searching ex-
.amination, covering the behavior of various
types of prices, wages, interest rates, costs of
production, productivity, and profits during pe-
riods when the rate of inflation in the price level
is advancing as well as when it is declining. The
study will also examine in this context data on
price expectations and price forecasts.It will
take advantage of and, I hope, contribute some-
thing to the work on inflation that Fabricant,
Cagan, Gordon, and others have been pursuing.
One of the ways in which this work will be
related to my recent responsibilities in Wash-
ington is that the data to be studied are, for the
most part, reported currently in the Bureau of
Labor Statistics' monthly Chartbook on Prices,
Wages and Productivity. Hence the results will
provide some of the basic historical information
that should be useful to users of that chartbook
in interpreting the current figures, in much the
same way that the National Bureau's studies of
14
economic indicators have supplied background
information helpful in the selection and inter-
pretation of indicatorsin the Department of
Commerce's Business Conditions Digest.
Although the value of much business cycle
research depreciates over the course of time
as institutional conditions change, as new evi-
dence accumulates, and as new concepts and
hypotheses are formulated, many findings have
had an extremely long life. Wesley C. Mitchell's
analytical description of the business cycle pro-
cess, published in 1913, is a case in point. In
particular, his account of the ways in which ris-
ing costs encroach on profits during a business
expansion and the consequences of this devel-
opment, seems applicable to the long period
of expansion during 1961—69, as well as to its
sequel. In a paper titled, "Productivity, Inflation
and Growth," prepared for a conference of the
National Commission on Productivity in April,
Iexamined recent experience in the light of
Mitchell's research. Some of the results are
depicted in Figures 1-3 and 1-4, notably:
1. Movements intherateofproductivity
growth during business cycles, which exercise
a dominant influence on rates of change in unit
labor costs (compare the top two lines in Fig-
ure l-3).
2. Productivity growth tends to decline as an
expansion proceeds, while unit labor costs as
well as other unit Costs rise more rapidly.
3. Costs and prices both rise during an ex-
pansion, but costs rise less rapidly than prices
at first, then more rapidly, with a consequent
decline in profit margins (see Figure 1-4).
4. These tendencies are reversed during busi-
ness recession and the subsequent recovery.
All these tendencies were described and ex-
plained by Mitchell, on the basis of data far less
adequate than we have now. Although it is rare
that a man's research should help materially to
explain events some 60 years later, the fact that
this does happen is an inspiration to those who
engage in, provide data for, and otherwise sup-
port new work on business cycles as well as
on productivity. This example seemed particu-larlyrelevant for the National Commission's
Conference, which was devoted to An Agenda
for Economic Research on Productivity. One of
the suggestions offered in my paper was that
the Commission develop a quarterly report on
productivity devoted to the dissemination of re-
seach findings, new efforts to improve produc-
tivity, current trends in productivity, and so forth.
Philip Klein, Pennsylvania State University, has
agreed to work on this project if it moves ahead.
A new evaluation of indicators, reported in
Part li, Section 2, by Victor Zarnowitz, is under-
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way—a project of the Bureau of Economic
Analysis in the Department of Commerce. The
last such study was published by the National
Bureau in 1967. The advent of new statistical
series, an additional business cycle, and new
findings about and new interest in the cyclical
process all point to the timeliness of another
review. The business cycle peak and trough
dates during the period since 1947 will be re-
viewed and new lists and classifications of eco-
nomic indicators will be developed.
In this connection the results of a study of the
Figure 1-3











































behavior of economic indicators during 1969—71
thatI completed about a year ago may be of
interest. The report was prepared as part of a
collection of essays in honor of Moses Abramo-
vitz,1 who himself was one of the initial contrib-
utors to the National Bureau's Studies of Busi-
ness Cycles with his classic study of inventories.
Tables 1-8 and 1-9 contain several findings from
this review of the recent performance of the set
of indicators selected in 1966 in the National Bu-
reau report Indicators of Business Expansions
and Contractions by Julius Shiskin and me.
The leads and lags of the twenty-six indicators
at the business cycle peak of November 1969
and trough of November 1970 conformed quite
well to the previous record. Among the twelve
leading indicators, 71 per cent of the observa-
tions on timing in 1969—70 were leads, as com-
pared with 86 per cent in 1948—61. Similar re-
sults are shown in Table 1-8 for the coincident
and lagging indicators, and for composite in-
dices based on them.
Tables 1-9 sets forth the results of an effort to
measure, or at least rank, the severity of the
1969—70 recession while it was in progress. The
method had been used with some success in
the recessions of 1957—58 and 1960—61. The
1969—70 recession, when it finally ended late
1 Paul A. David and Melvin Reder, eds., Nations and
Households in Economic Growth, New York, Academic
Press, Inc. (to be published December 1973).
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in 1970, turned out to be, by most measure-
ments, one of the mildest recessions in the past
25 years. In Table 1-9 (bottom line) it is rated as
more severe than the "mini-recession" of 1967
and tied with the mild recession of 1960—61.
Those of 1957—58, 1953—54, and 1948—49 were
more serious on the whole. Now this result was
not, of course, known when the recession began
late in 1969. The procedure adopted early in
1970 was to compare the changes in the indica-
tors following the tentative business cycle peak
(which was then set at December 1969—the
National Bureau later selected November 1969)
with their changes over corresponding intervals
in the earlier recessions. The initial result was
that by February 1970, the second month after
the tentative peak, the twelve leading indicators
showed declines sharper thanin1967 and
1960—61, but less sharp than in the three pre-
ceding recessions (hence the rank of 3 in the
top line of Table 1-9). The eight coincident indi-
cators showed smaller declines than in any of
the previous recessions. Of course, since this
was based on changes over a very brief inter-
val—2 months—it was not too dependable. By
and large, however, the relative mildness of the
1969—70 recession was confirmedin subse-
quent months, with the leading indicators ini-
tially suggesting a somewhat larger dip than the
coincident indicators did. The General Motors
strike in the autumn of 1970 affected the corn-
1948 '49'50'5 1'52 53'54'5S'56'57'58'59'60'61'62'63'64'65'66'67'68 '69'70'71'72'73TABLE 1-8
Leads and Lags of Twenty-Six Indicators at Business
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a, The peaks are November 1948, July 1953, July 1957, May
1960. The trough8 are October 1949, August 1954, April 1958,
February 1961.
b. The leading index is based on the twelve leading Indica-
tors, the coincident index on five of the eight coincident Indi-
cators, and the lagging index on the six laggIng indicators. The
number in parentheses is the series number in Business Con-
ditions Digest.
Note: The twenty-six indicators are those selected in 1966
(Geoffrey Moore and Julius Shiskin,Indicators of Business
Expansions and Contractions, New York, Columbia University
Press for the National Bureau of Economic Research, 1967) with
one exception. Nonagricultural placements was replaced by Ini-
tial claims for unemployment insurance. This substitution was
madeSeptember 196g. at which time nonagricultural place-
ments was dropped from the short list of leading indicators In
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Business Conditions Digest (for the reasons, see BCD, Sep-
tember 1969).
Rough coincidences include exact coincidences (shown In
parentheses) and leads or lags of 3 months or less. The total
number of timing comparisons Is the sum of the leads, exact
coincidences, and lags. This, plus the number of turns skipped,
isthe total number of business cycle turns covered by the
series. The "percentage in appropriate class" is based on the
number of leads, rough coincidences, or lags, respectively, di-
vided by the total number of timing observations for the corre-
sponding groups ofindicators
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Business ConditIons
Digest, February 1973, Appendix F. Three additional specific
cycle turns are used here: a trough (January 1948, lead 10
months) in the unemployment rate; a peak (February 1969, lead
9 months); and a trough (November 1971, lag 12 months) in the
change in manufacturing and trade inventories.
At eight preceding peaks and
troughs, 1948—61




At Nov. 1969 peak and
Nov. 1970 trough
Ratio, ooincident to lagging
(820 ÷ 830) 2 1 (0) 0 100 —6.5
Leading, original trend (811) 1 1(1) 0 50 —3.5
Leading, reverse trend—adj. (810) 2. 1(0) 0 100 —1.5
Coincident (820) 0 2 (1) 1 100 +0.5
Lagging (830) 0 0 (0) 2 100 +7.5
At eight preceding peeks and
troughs, 1948—61
Ratio, coincident to lagging
(820 ÷ 830) 8 0 8 2 (0) 0 100 —9.2
Leading, original trend (811) 8 0 7 2 (1) 0 88 —7.6
Leading, reverse trend—adJ. (810) 8 0 8 2 (0) 0 100 —5.1
Coincident (820) 8 0 2 8 (5) 1 100 —0.4
Lagging (830) 8 0 0 6 (2) 6 75 +2.1TABLE 1-9
Ranking of Six Periods of Business Contraction in Successive Months,




Rank of Average Rank of 12 Leading Indicators
Business Cycle Peak Date
Correlation
Coefficientb Dec.1969 Jan. 1967 May 1960 Aug. 1957 July 1953 Oct.1946
2nd month 3 2 1 6 5 4 .80
3rd month 4 2 1 6 3 5 .80
4th month 3 1.5* 1.5 6 5 4 .86
5th month 3 1 2 5.5 4 5.5 .99
6th month 2 1 3 6 4 5 .94
7th month 2 1 3 6 4 5 .97
8th month 2 1 3 6* 4 5 .97
9th month 3 1 2* 6 4 5 .97
10th month 4 1 2 3 5 6 .71
11th month 4*
1 2 5 6 3 .63
12th month 5 1 2 3 4 6* .63
2nd month 1
Rank of Average Rank of 8 Coincident Indicators
2 3 6 5 4 .80
3rd month 1 2 3 6 4 5 .89
4th month 1 .5 1 5* 3 6 4 5 .94
5th month 2 1 3 6 5 4 .89
6th month 2 1 3 6 5 4 .89
7th month 2 1 3 6 4.5 4.5 .94
8th month 2 1 3 6* 5 4 .89
9th month 2 1 3* 6 4 5 .97
10th month 2 1 3 6 5 4 .89
11th month 2* 1 3 4 6 5 .80
12th month 2 1 3 4 5 6* .89
2,5
Rank of Business Cycle Contraction, Peak to Trough
1 2.5 5.5 4 5.5
* Business cycle trough date.
a. The reference peak dates are those used at the time the ranking of the 1969—70 contraction was carried
out (beginning February 1970) and differ in some instances from the standard NBER dates. The NBER dates
do not include a contraction from January 1967 to May 1967, and peaks are November 1969 instead of
December 1969, July 1957 instead of August 1957, and November 1948 instead of October 1948.
b. With rank of business cycle contraction, peak to trough (bottom line). For six ranks the correlation coef-
ficient should exceed .83 to be significant at the .05 level.
c. Based on changes from business cycle peak to trough in eight coincident indicators.
parisons later in the year.
The stability of the rankings in each column—
i.e., during each of the earlier recessions—is
worth noting, as well as the degree of correla-
tion of each set of ranks with the'ultimate"
ranking in the bottom line of the table. In most
cases, the ultimate ranking could be rather
closely approximated during the early months
of a recession.
A final result reported in the paper concerns
the use of leading indicators to forecast magni-
tudes of change in gross national product and
other variables.In 1968 Iexplored one such
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scheme briefly,conceiving ofitmore as a
mechanical standard against which other fore-
casting methods could be compared than as a
forecasting method in its own right. The results
of applying the method since 1968 are mixed,
although it clearly remains a tougher standard
to beat than the usual "naive model," in which
either the recent level or recent change is sim-
ply extrapolated into the future. Table 1-10 makes
this comparison, in terms of both the mean
absolute error of forecasting year-to-year per-
centage changes and the degree to which fore-
cast and actual changes are correlated. TheTABLE 1-10
Forecasts of Calendar Year Percentage Changes in Gross National Product
GNP in current $ GNP in constant $
1962—67 1968—72 1962—72 1962—67 1968—72 1962—72
Mean absolute error (percentage)
Leading index regression' 1.0 2.4 1.7 1.0 1 .8 1.4
Economic reportb 1.3 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
Naive model—same changec 1.8 2.5 2.1 1.6 2.9 2.2
Correlation coefficient,
forecast and actual change
Leading index regression' .69 .51 .47 .97 .55 .66
Economic reportb .34 .80 .63 .48 .93 .76
Naive model—same change° —.04 —.19 —.04 —.45 0 .08
a. Regression fitted to data for 1952—61, with the percentage change in index of twelve leading indicators,
reverse trend-adjusted, measured from fiscal year average to July—December average.
b. Economic Report of the President, January 1962 through January 1972. Some percentage changes, not
given in the Report, were inferred from statements in the Report.
c. Forecasts made on the assumption that next year's percentage change will be the same as last year's.
naive model yields larger average errors (dis-
crepancies averaging between 2 and 3 per-
centage points between forecast and actual
percentage changes) and forecasts that are un-
correlated with the actual changes. The leading
index regression does better than this, both in
1962—67 and 1968—72, but not so well as the
set of actual forecasts shown in the table, taken
from successive issues of the Economic Report
of the President. In this case, the mean error
has been in the neighborhood of 1percentage
point.Itis interesting, in view of the concern
about the GNP forecast of $1,065 billions for
1971, which involved an error of 1.5 percentage
points, that the average forecast error during
1968—72 was smaller than that during 1962—67,
and that the correlation between forecast and
actual changes was substantially higher. Hence
there is some evidence of an improvement in
the Economic Report forecasts in recent years,
both in an absolute sense and relative to either
the naive model or leading index regression
standards.
The current study of U.S. indicators being di-
rected by Zarnowitz is closely related to another
project thatIhope can soon be launched;
namely, a study of international economic indi-
cators. As presently envisaged, this would be
a demonstration project designed to show how
selected lists of monthly and quarterly indica-
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tors for the major developed countries can be
effectively organized to throw light on the cur-
rent state of the business cycle in each country.
The study will bring together work that has been
and is underway in several countries—espe-
cially Canada, Japan, Great Britain, and West
Germany—and will utilize existing compilations
by the National Bureau, the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, and
other agencies. The immediate objective is to
produce a graphic and tabular arrangement of
the principal leading, coincident, and lagging
indicators, demonstrating the potential value of
a current publication of this type, produced reg-
ularly by some governmental or international or-
ganization. Figures 1-5 and 1-6, reproduced from
a quarterly publication of the Japanese Eco-
nomic Planning Agency, illustrates what is now
being done in that country. Over the next few
years, if the project is successful in generating
interest and support, a large amount of analyt-
ical work should be done for each country to
set forth the properties of the data: their cyclical
behavior;theirsignificance,limitations,and
comparability; and their international interrela-
tions. The importance of research along these
linesisunderlined by the profound conse-
quences for international monetary relations,
trade, capital flows, and the balance of pay-
ments that appear to result from the presenceFigure 1-5
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20or absence of divergencies among countries in
the state of the business cycle in which they find
themselves at any given time.
I expect that Ilse Mintz' work on growth cycles
in the United States and Germany will prove
highly useful in this program of research, not
only because of the methods and standards she
has developed, but also because it appears that
retardations in growth have international reper-
cussions similar to those of business cycles.
For example, during each of the U.S. "growth
recessions" that, according to Mintz' new chro-
nology, occurred during U.S. business cycle ex-
pansions (namely,in 1951—52, 1962—63, and
1966—67), growth recessions or cyclical con-
tractions occurred in Great Britain, Germany,
and possibly other European nations. This in it-
self seems to imply a higher degree of interna-
tional sensitivity to cyclical movements than one
would infer from the U.S. business cycle chro-
nology alone. Moreover, since each of the U.S.
growth recessions were marked by significant
declines in U.S. leading indicators, it would be
useful to inquire into the corresponding behav-
ior of leading indicators in Europe.
My initial activities at the National Bureau,
which are being supported in part by a grant
by the Hoover Institution, Stanford University,
have been aimed at completing some short
papers that were in various stages of prepara-
tion whileI was in Washington. Four of them
pertain to unemployment. "On the 'Statistical
Significance' of Changes in Employment and
22
Unemployment" appeared in the March issue
of The Statistical Reporter (U.S. Office of Man-
agement and Budget). This essay, together with
'How Full Is Full Employment?," 'A New Mea-
sure of the Severity of Unemployment," and
"Sources of Change in Unemployment," is be-
ing published by the American Enterprise In-
stitute. Another paper, "The Importance of Pro-
ductivity," was in the May issue of Business
Economics. "The Current Recovery in Produc-
tivity:Its Role in Costs, Price Profit Mar-
gins," was presented in May at a conference
sponsored by The Conference Board and was
publishedinThe Conference Board Record,
July 1973. Julius Shiskin and Ihave written a
brief essay on "Why the Leading Indicators
Lead," expanding on a still briefer version that
was published in the New York Times, Novem-
ber 19, 1972.
Other business cycle studies in progress re-
ported in Part II, Section 2 are those on Money
by Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz, on the
Determinants of Investment by Robert Eisner,
and on Household Capital Formation by Thomas
Juster and Paul Wachtel. A manuscript on Fore-
casts with Quarterly Macroeconometric Models
by Yoel Haitovsky, George Treyz, and Vincent
Su is being readied for press. Su has started
to bring the record of econometric model fore-
casts up to date in order to extend this analysis.
Victor Zarnowitz' volume, Orders, Production
and Investment, was published this spring.
Geoffrey H. MooreINFLATION AND COMMON STOCK PRICES IN A
CYCLICAL CONTEXT'
JOHN LINTNER
Judgments of portfolio managers, investment
officers of major financial institutions, and other
observers regarding the impact of inflation on
the returns from common stock investments
have fluctuated widely over the last 25 years.
Whenever there has been concern about infla-
tion as a market factor, there has also been a
currently fashionable judgment regarding the
impact of inflation on prospective stock prices
and thereby on the attractiveness of stocks as
an investment. But a review of the record shows
that these judgments have shifted repeatedly
between the view that inflation would depress
the returns on equity investments and the op-
posite view that inflation would enhance the re-
turns on common stocks.
A review of the record suggests that this vac-
illationessentially generalized recent market
experience. If stocks had been rising in the face
of inflationary concern, inflation was regarded
as good for stock prices; but if inflationary gen-
eral price movements had been accompanied
by falling stock prices, then inflation was an evil
omen. Recall that during the inflationary surge
of 1947—48, earnings considerably more than
doubled, but stock prices were sluggish and
price/earnings ratios fell to roughly half their
prewar levels. The dominant view was that in-
flation had been and would be a major depres-
sant on stock values because of transient in-
ventory profits and understatements of proper
charges for depreciation that impaired the qual-
ity of reported earnings. Nevertheless, during
the boom in stock prices in the mid-1950s, the
quickening pace of inflation was widely used
as a major justification for the purchase of com-
mon stock (and mutual funds) by individuals and
for increased investments of insurance company
assets and pension reserves in common stocks,
specifically on the grounds that equities would
This material represents one of the chaptersina
larger study of the effects of inflation and inflationary ex-
pectations on common stocks, which in turnis one of
five studies now underway covering different aspects of
the effects of inflation on financial markets. The other
related studies are reportedinPartII,Section 4.
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be a good hedge because further inflation would
raise stock prices:
Similar generalizations that further inflation
would enhance equity values were again widely
current from1965to1968.Butagain,in
1969—70, there was a very high inverse cor-
relation between changes in stock prices and
the most recent news or pronouncement on how
the current battle against inflation was going.
If the current month's annualized rate of change
in the Consumer's (or the Wholesale) Price In-
dex was higher (or lower) than the last month's,
the stock market would be down (or up) after
the announcement. In 1971 and 1972 there con-
tinued to be a general coincidence of periods
of strongly improving stock prices with intervals
of declining inflation, which undoubtedly rein-
forced the view that inflation is bad for the stock
market.In keeping with this view, the stock
market turned lower in early 1973 immediately
after the announcement of a weakened price-
wage control program and continued to fall as
rates of inflation increased.
Although this current version of the conven-
tional wisdom agrees with the pessimistic con-
clusions prevalent in the late forties, it stands in
marked contrast to the optimistic conclusions of
the mid-fifties and of 1965—68 when inflation
was generally thought to favor equity invest-
ments as stock prices were rising along with the
cost of living and product prices. This pessimis-
tic view also runs directly counter to the tradi-
tional and widely accepted classical economic
theory of the relation between inflation and
stock prices.
The Classical Theory of the
Relation Between Inflation and
Equity Prices
Standard economic theory, from itsclassical
origins in the last century on up into modern
times, has always regarded the real value of
unlevered equity as being invariant to inflation-
ary or deflationary changes in the price level,so that in principle its current money value will
rise or fall in proportion to relative changes in
the general index of prices of goods and ser-
vices. In the classical formulations, this conclu-
sion rested on essentially three basic proposi-
tions in a context of standard comparative static
equilibrium analysis.
First, the real returns from ownership of capi-
tal goods will be invariant to the general price
level, since these returns depend fundamentally
on production functions or input-output rela-
tions and factor proportions that are invariant
to the general level of prices. Second, the (real)
market value (V*) of these ownership claims
would be equal to these real returns (X*) on





Third, the real rate of interest, r*, is invariant
to the price level per se because, as Irving
Fisher demonstrated near the turn of the cen-
tury,2 market clearing equilibrium conditions re-
quire that r* must be simultaneously equal (1) to
the marginal real product of capital goods, and
(2) to the marginal rate of substitution of real
goods between adjacent time periods (which
Fisher called the marginal rate of "time prefer-
ence"). The second condition must be satisfied
in equilibrium because self-interest ensures that
consumers will have adjusted their spending
and saving out of current income until they
are indifferent about having x less goods and
services during the current period if they can
get x (1 + r*) more goods and services during
the next period, and vice versa; correspond-
ingly,profit-maximizingself-interestensures
that firm's capital stocks will have been adjusted
to eliminate any discrepancy between the mar-
ginal product of their use in production and r*.
Because consumers (and producers) have no
"money illusion" and act solely on the basis of
exchange ratios (or "terms of trade") between
2 The Nature of Capita! and Income, Macmillan, New
York, 1906; The Rate of interest, Macmillan, New York,
1907; as well as the later Theory of Interest, Macmillan,
New York, 1930, Chapters II, XV, XIX, and XX.
real goods and services at different points in
time, the real rate of interest, r*, is invariant to
the price level as such in any period and conse-
quently is invariant to the rate of inflation per Se.
Since the real returns, are invariant to in-
flation by the first proposition, and the real rate
of interest, r*,is correspondingly invariant by
proposition three, the real value of the equity
in proposition two and equation (1) must also
be invariant to inflation per se (and ceteris pan-
bus!). Finally, the constancy of the real value
of course means that the current money value
=
• will vary in direct proportion to
the index of the general price level. Higher
or lower rates of inflation imply capital gains
(in before-tax percentage terms) on unlevered
equity equal to the rate of inflation.
It is instructive to notice a perhaps surprising
corollary, also based on Fisher's work at the
turn of the century. Fisher showed that the nom-
inal or money rate of interest at any given time
would be equal to the interest rate in real terms
adjusted upward by the expected future rate of
inflation.3 It follows that the money value of un-
levered common stocks at any point in time—
i.e.,their real value restated in terms of the
prevailing price level—is independent of the
amount of inflation expected in the future.In
particular, as John Burr Williams argued,4 "No
common stock in a company free from debt is
worth more today merely because the price level
is going to go up tomorrow."
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Specifically, if in the current period money prices are
expected to increase 100 pper cent per year, a current
dollar return t years in the future would be discounted at
a rate of (1 + (1 + pa). But if prices are expected
to increase at 100 p' per cent per year, the constant real
returns X* will be expected to amount to X(1 + pe)t
when statedinthethen-current money units.Since
+ + (1 + p6)' = X*I(1 + every
term in the summation on the right side of equation (1) is
invariant to the value assigned to the expected inflation
rate p6.
Theory of Investment Value, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, 1938. The quotation is from page 103. As Wil-
liams observed: "Because inflation itself makes stocks go
up, most people think that the mere prospect of inflation
should do so too. Yet this is not true . ..after all, why
should an investor pay more in sound money today simply
because a stock is going to be quoted higher in depreci-
ated money tomorrow? Furthermore, how can stocks be a
hedge against inflation, protecting their owners during in-
flation, if they go up before inflation? They cannot discount
the same event twice. No, they should respond but once
to inflation, and that during inflation, step by step, dollar
for dollar, with the rise in general prices."But notice that Williams' conclusion with re-
spect to unlevered common stock isjust a
special case of the more general and funda-
mental conclusions that follow from the classi-
cal analysis. In particular, is defined as the
total real return to the ownership of capital
goods—and the capitalization of these returns
by the real rate of interest, r*, identifies V* in
equation (1) as the real market value of the total
of ownership claims against the entire real re-
turns provided by capital goods. The invari-
ances of real returns X* and the real interest
ratefrom the first and third propositions thus
makes (1) the total real market value of all own-
ership claims against the returns from capital
goods invariant with respect to (a) current rates
of inflation, and (b) expected future rates of in-
flation; (2) the total current market value of all
these claims (a) will vary in proportion to the
current realized rates of inflation, but (b) will be
invariant to expected future rates of inflation.
These conclusions apply directly to the value of
unlevered common stock, because in the ab-
sence of debt the equity holders receive the en-
tire return to the ownership of capital goods.
When ownership of the underlying capital
goods is partially financed by debt, however,
the classicists regarded the impact of inflation
on the marketvalues of equity as being even
more favorable.5 Debtors gain and creditors
lose whenever there is an increase in the antici-
pated rate of inflation over the remaining life
of the outstanding debt. But the loss in the real
market value of these debts (V) when the ex-
For specific references, see Harry Gunnison Brown,
Rising Prices and Investments" (esp. pp. 46-49), chap-
terIII,in How to Invest When Prices are Rising, Irving
Fisher, ed., 1912. Brown, then an Assistant Professor at
Yale, had been a student of Fisher's. See alsoIrving
Fisher, The Purchasing Power of Money, Macmillan, New
York, 1920, pp. 58-59 and 170-171; J. M. Keynes, Tract
on Monetary Relorm, Macmillan, London, 1923, p. 18; and
Irving Fisher, The Money Illusion, Adeiphi, New York, 1928,
esp. pp. 78-81.
It is significant that these early authors, like J. B. Wil-
liams later, specifically determined the total value of the
firm and then subtracted the value of the debt to deter-
mine the value of the equity, precisely as required by the
famous Modigliani—Miller "PropositionI," which proved
that this classical relation could under certain conditions
be extended to models in which risk was incorporated
rigorously. (Franco Modigliani and Merton H. Miller, "The
Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of
Investment," American Economic Review, June 1958.)
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pected future rates of inflation increase must
be matched by an increase in the real value of
levered equity (Vi), since V*, the
invariant real capitalized value of the total real
return to the ownership of the capital
goods themselves. Moreover, when thisin-
creased real value of levered equity is restated
in current market prices,its market value in
nominal dollars will of course also fully reflect
any increase in the general price level. Conse-
quently, in the classical framework, owners of
levered equities benefit from a capital gain in
real terms whenever the expected rate of infla-
tion increases; they also receive a capital gain
in nominal money equal to the full current rate
of inflation in general prices.6
Later work in the classical tradition has of
course substituted the more refined concept of
"net-debtor position" (which offsets the finan-
cial assets held by a company against its debts)
for leverage in the sense of long-term debt,7 bu
the analysis carries through without substantive
change as long as financial liabilities are larger
than financial assets. Firms in a net-creditor po-
sition, however, will incur real capital losses on
their net financial asset position that willat
leastpartiallyoffset and reduce the capital
gains in current money terms otherwise asso-
ciated withinflation.Kessel's classic study8
found(inanadmittedly smallbut random
sample) that industrial firms were about evenly
divided between net debtors and net creditors.
More important, he found that the market equity
6 The classical arguments in this paragraph were most
fully and explicitly developed in Williams, op. cit., pp. 107-
109, 111-114. Williams provides the following summary
of the relevant conclusions on page 107: "Only for equities
without leverage, however, does the rule that stocks should
not rise in anticipation of inflation hold true.If senior is-
sues are outstanding, then stocks should respond twice,
or rather in two steps, to inflation; first on the promise,
and second during the fulfillment, of inflation. The first
response should be abrupt, and should reflect the gain by
stockholders of the prospective loss by bondholders, while
the second should be gradual, and should reflect the
change in the purchasing power of money from month to
month."
Classical writers had either ignored the financial as-
sets held by business firms, or more generally they just
implicitly assumed that financial liabilities were larger than
financial assets.
8 Reuben A. Kessel, "Inflation-Caused Wealth Redis-
tribution: A Test of a Hypothesis," American Economic
Review (March 1956), pp. 128-141.values of net debtors gained relative to those of
net creditors during inflationary periods and fell
behind relatively during deflation.9 This confir-
mation of the classical expectation has gener-
ally been supported by subsequent
The Federal Reserve's Flow of Funds data
show that the consolidated balance sheet of
nonfinancial corporations has consistently been
in a net-debtor position since 1945. Their net
financial liabilities grew from about $50 billion
in the late 1950s to nearly $57 billion in 1965
and jumped to over $200 billion by 1971. Con-
version of bonds and mortgages to current mar-
ket values would not alter the fact of a substan-
tial consolidated net-debtor position,h1 nor the
general pattern of its strong increase in recent
years. It is thus evident that economists working
within the framework of the classical analysis
would predict that the current market value of
the equity of the large majority of corporations
would at least vary directly with changes in gen-
eral price levels, even though the capital gains
in current money terms would not necessarily
be fully proportional to current rates of inflation;
and the common stock of firms in a substantial
net-debtor position should show a more than
proportionate capitalgainincurrent money
terms.
'Kessel also pointed out that although commercial
banks were extraordinarily heavy debtors, with ratios of
debts to equity several times larger than industrial cor-
porations, their monetary assets were still larger—and as
net creditors, the real value of their equity fell between
1942 and 1948, both absolutely and relative to industrial
firms.
'° G. L. Bach and Albert Ando, 'The Redistributional
Effects of Inflation," Review of Economics and Statistics
(February 1957), find that "the debtor-creditor effect does
occur, [although] income statement effects were generally
more dominant" (p. 12)—and we return to these "other
factors" later. Much stronger evidence in favor of the
debtor-creditor effect is found in Ft A. Kessel and A. A.
Alchian, "The Meaning and Validity ofInflation-Induced
Lag of Wages Behind Prices," Economic Review
(March 1960). See also most recently G. L. Bach, The New
Inflation: Causes, Effects, Cures, Brown University Press,
Providence, 1972, esp. pp. 31-43,
''The New York Stock Exchange Fact Book (1972),
p. 79, shows that the year-end ratios of the market values
of all listed bonds as a percentage of par (face) values
were:
1966: 91.50 1968: 86.69 1970: 83.60
1967: 87.94 1969: 77.80 1971: 89.10
Applying the discounts implied by these prices to all
mortgages as well as bonds in Table I-il clearly leaves




















1945$ 69.3 $ 32.1 $ 43.1 $—5.9
1948 82.0 44.0 63.6 —25.6
1951 110.9 54.1 92.9 —36.1
1955 142.2 73.6 110.2 —41.6
1958 163.4 95.4 121.9 —53.9
1962 206.5 125.0 146.0 —64.5
1965 258.7 150.6 195.0 —86.9
1968 317.1 202.9 261.2 —147.0
1969 341.0 219.7 300.0 —178.7
1970 354.5 245.2 315.6 —206.3
1971 379.8 276.3 324.1 —220.6
a. Bonds plus all mortgage debt.
Source: Flow of Funds Accounts: Financial Assets
and Liabilities Outstanding, 1945—1971, Federal Re-
serve System, June 1972.
More Modern Theoretical Writings
The classical economists viewed the economy
as seeking and reaching an equilibrium in real
terms, and this "real" equilibrium was inde-
pendent of the current levels of money prices,
which depended, by way of the classical Quan-
tity Theory of Money, on the actions of the mon-
etary authorities. More modern theoretical (and
econometric) work, building on the early in-
sights of Keynes and Hicks in the mid-1930s,
has developed increasingly complex and more
realistic models of the economy in which (1) the
level and equilibrium structure of activity in all
the real sectors involving production, goods,
and. services;(2) the level and structure of
money prices for all of these goods and ser-
vices; and (3) the interest rates, yields, and
market prices of a rich menu of financial assets
are all interrelated, interdependent, and mutu-
ally determined. Similarly, the latter-day "mone-
tarists"ofthe Friedman—Chicago—St.Louis
School have also moved significantly beyond
the simple dichotomies of the strict classical
structure.
Most of these elaborations and developments
are not directly germane to our present con-
cerns. What needs to be recognized and em-phasized here is that the basic conclusion of the
classical economists that the nominal prices of
common stocks will vary directly with changes
in (the appropriate index of) genera) prices—
even though not necessarily in strict proportion
—is still retained and found in the more modern
and sophisticated models. For instance, Lloyd
Metzler in his seminal paper "Wealth, Saving
and the Rate of Inflation' 12 focused on common
stock as the primary security in his model and
argued that "in the absence of movements in
real interest rates, common stock prices rise or
fall to the same extent that other prices rise or
fall, so that in general inflation or deflation does
not affect the real value of securities." 13 Simi-
larly, Martin J. Bailey includes "corporate shares
and other [real] assets whose [market] values
tend to move with the general price level" and
points out that the ownership of "real assets
are a significant part of the community's wealth,
and other things equal, their total real value is
independent of the money price level." 14
James Tobin's various progressively more
general models break the automatic tie between
prices of capital stocks and consumers goods
found in earlier classical models, but he too
argues that "The main sources of inflation or
deflation cause both capital goods and con-
sumption goods and consumption prices to rise.
Ownership ofcapitalgoods (and common
stocks) is therefore a good though incomplete
hedge against the risks of changes in the con-
sumer price index." 15 Although Tobin's models
12Journalot Political Economy (April 1951), pp. 93-116.
13 The quotation is from page 99. In the Metzler model,
if the central bank holds a constant traction of outstanding
securities at all times, the real interest rate and the real
value of the common stock outstanding will be invariant to
the price level as Io9g as the nominal money supply varies
in proportion (i.e., the real value of private money holdings
is constant).
Martin J. Bailey, National Income and the Price Level,
McGraw-Hill, New York, 1962, pp. 106, 107.
15 This conclusion immediately follows his observation
that "Whether in the stock market or in the markets for
real capital goods, the terms of trade between capital
ownership and consumption goods may turn in favor of
owners of capital or against them. But what happens to
these terms of trade is quite independent of what happens
to the terms of trade between consumption goods and
money." See "An Essay on the Principles of Debt Man-
agement," in Fiscal and Debt Management Policies, pub-
lished by the committee on Money and credit, 1963, and
reprinted in James Tobin, Essays in Economics, Vol.I,
Markham, Chicago, 1971. The quotation is from pages 401-
402 in the second source.
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emphasize the primary importance of any di-
vergence between the rates of return provided
in the stock market to the ownership of existing
capital assets and the marginal productivity of
these capital assets as a primary driving force
inthe system,16 the commodity pricelevel
per se "does not affect the real rate of return
on capital, calculated either on reproduction
cost or on current market value." 17Franco
Modigliani also explicitly retains this same clas-
sical "building-block" at the core of his model
underlying the stock market equation18 in the
MIT—FRB—PENN model, which is one of the
most sophisticated of the modern large-scale
econometric models.
Finally, although our references to Metzler,
Tobin, and Modigliani illustrate the prevalence
of earlier classical judgments concerning the
favorable impact of inflation on stock markets in
the recent work of leading neo-Keynesians, the
same premise or anterior conclusion is also re-
tained in the work of modern neo-monetarists.
For instance, Friedman and Schwartz seek to
infer the expected rate of inflation by examining
the difference between the current market yields
of stocks and. bonds;19 such an inference is valid
only if, among other things, the capital markets
16 See his "Money, Capital and Other Stores of Value,"
American Economic Review (May 1961), reprinted in Es-
says in Economics, op. cit., where on page 226 he writes
"The strategic variable—the ultimate gauge of expansion
or deflation, of monetary tightness or ease—is the rate of
return that the community of wealth-owners requirein
order to absorb the existing capital stock (valued at cur-
rent prices), no more no less,into their portfolios and
balance sheets. This rate may be termed the supply price
of capital.Ifitis lower than the marginal productivity of
capital, there will be excess demand for capital, stimulat-
ing Increases in prices of capital goods and additions to
the stock. If the supply price of capital is higher than its
marginal productivity, demand for capital will be insuf-
ficient to absorb the existing stock; its valuation will tend
to fall, discouraging production of new capital goods."
See also his "A General Equilibrium Approach to Mone-
tary Theory," Journal of Money,Credit, and Banking
(February 1969), reprinted as Chapter 18 in Essays in
Economics. Sections 4 and 9 of this reference are espe-
cially relevant to the text above.
17Tobin, "General Equilibrium Approach," inEssays
/n Economics, p. 328.
18 See Franco Modigliani, "The Valuation of Corporate
Stock," mimeo., 1973, prepared for the forthcoming vol-
ume developing the econometrics of the entire model.
19 Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz, A
Monetary History of the United States, 1867—1960, Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research, New York, 1963. And
see also the discussion of similar studies in Richard Roll,
"Interest Rates on Monetary Assets and Commodity Price
Index Changes," The Journal of Finance (May 1972).are equilibrated in terms of expected real, as
distinct from expected nominal, returns. The
most recent study relying on this classical prem-
ise is a paper by Hendershott and Van Home.20
The authors of the more recent work cited
have of course abandoned the simple classical
assumption that the structure of prices and re-
turns in financial markets do not affect the equi-
librium of the real sectors of the economy, and
they also have moved beyond the classical pre-
occupation with an essentially long-run static
equilibrium to deal with shorter-term equilibria
and the dynamic adjustment of the economy.
Especially in view of the added complexity and
flexibility being introduced into their models in
other respects, it is indeed striking that they still
continue to rely on the classical premise that the
real returns to the ownership of capital goods
will be invariant to the price level—and that
stock prices will consequently rise more or less
in proportion to the commodity price level de-
termined elsewhere in the system.
To be sure, there was a considerable body
of other research available while these models
were being developed that tended to support
these conclusions, In particular, there was an
impressive array of historical research covering
a wide variety of countries and time periods that
had uniformly concluded that wages had usually
Tagged behind price increases and that real
wages generally had fallen during inflation.21
In addition, during World War II and on through
the early 1960s researchers focused their mod-
els on a 'demand-pull" inflation and inferred
such a lag22 that increases the real rates of re-
turn to capital, and thereby should make stock
market prices stated in current dollars rise more
than proportionately to the increase in the gen-
eral price level. Notice that this is very similar
20 Patric H. Hendershott and James C. Van Home, "Ex-
pected Inflation Implied by Capital Market Rates," The
Journal of Finance (May 1973).
21 This earlier work is reviewed in Kessel and Aichian,
op. cit., and includes several studies of different countries
and times by E. S. Hamilton, Wesley Mitchell, Alvin Han-
sen, Bresciani-Turroni, Irving Fisher, and others.
22 J, M. Keynes, How to Pay for the War, Macmillan,
London, 1940, pp. 61-70; A. Smithies, "The Behavior of
Money National Income Under Inflationary Conditions,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 56 (1942), pp. 113-
229; F. D. Holzman, "Income Determination in Open In-
flation,"Review of Economics and Statistics,Vol. 32
(1950), pp. 150-158.
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in substance to the transfer of resources from
creditors to debtors that made the stocks of
companies in a net-debtor position rise more
than the general price level in the classical anal-
ysis. But Kessel and Alchian's later careful re-
view23 of the evidence found that either wages
had not "lagged" over any significant period as
alleged, or that lagging wages could be readily
explained by shifts in underlyin'g real factor sup-
plies and demands rather by inflationit-
self.24 Similarly, Cargill's still more recent analy-
sis using spectral methods on the same bodies
of data found "no agreement with the wage-lag
hypothesis in the frequency range identified as
the short run since wages and prices appear
to be coincident here."25 Interestingly enough,
Cargill did find weak support for a wage lag in
the long-run frequency range.26
Beginning in the late 1950s, and especially in
the last few years, the focus of theoretical work
has shifted to the contrary "cost-push" situation
in which wage increases lead price increases
and in a sense may be "responsible" for them.
Wages of course can "lead" and rise faster than
prices without putting pressure on commodity
and product prices if the increase in real wages
is less than the increase in productivity—in this
case, the ratio of price to unit labor cost and
the gross margin before capital charges are
widened. But wage increases greater than gains
in productivity increase labor cost per unit of
output and create a cost-push that impairs gross
profit margins unless prices are raised in tan-
dem. We will review the research dealing with
cost-push and other work casting doubt on the
adequacy of the classical analysis after we ex-
amine the direct evidence available on the rela-
tion between inflation and stock prices.
23 Kessel and Aichian, op. cit.
24 In a separate analysis, however, they found that the
relative increases in value of fifty-six large indus-
trial companies between 1940 and 1952 were negatively
and significantly related to the ratios of their outlays for
wages to their (market) equity, contrary to the positive
relation expected on the wage-lag hypothesis.
25 1. Cargill, "An Empirical Investigation of the Wage-
Lag Hypothesis," American Economic Review (December
1969). The quotationisfrom the summary, page 811
(italics added).
26 "At the long run frequency components where co-
herence is significant only about half of the components
indicate a significant time difference between prices and
wages. At these components, the timing relationship is
predominantly a wage-lag" (p. 811).A Brief Review of Some Evidence
There has been surprisingly little statistical work
directly relevant to the impact of inflation on
stock prices. William C. Greenough's studies
of United States data from 1880 to 1950 showed
that common stocks had "provided a consider-
ably better protection against inflation than debt
obligations" but that it is'unwise to commit all
of one's retirement savings to equity investment,
since variations in prices of common stocks are
much too pronounced to permit full reliance on
them for the stable (real) income needed during
retirement."27 Passing over other studies (all
of which, so far as is known, tend to support
conclusions), the most relevant
work is Phillip Cagan's analysis of the long-term
performance of the common stocks of vari-
ous countries.28 Cagan found that the common
stocks represented in the comprehensive in-
dices of stock market values in most countries
tended to maintain their real values over inter-
vals of 10 or 15 years or more in spite of infla-
tion. I.M.F. data for airhost thirty countries over
the period 1939—69 show a positive relation be-
tween the percentage change in nominal equity
prices and inflation, although most of the 'ex-
planatory power" depends on observations for
a few severe inflations.
Michael W. Keran's study of "Expectations,
Money and the Stock Market"29 developed an
econometric model of stock market prices fitted
to quarterly data from the first quarter of 1953
through the second quarter of 1970. He con-
cluded that of increasing inflation
were found to lower the level of stock prices and
not to raise itis commonly argued. Inflation-
ary expectations increase both expected corpo-
rate earnings and the interest rate at which these
earnings are discounted .. .[but] changes in
inflation expectations exert a much greater in-
fluence on the rate of discount than on expected
earnings. This explains the negative relationship
27 william C. Greenough, A New Approach to Retire-
ment Income, TIM, New York, 1951. The quotations are
from pages 13-14. Greenough's earlier studies may also
be cited.
28 See the brief descriptioninPartII,Section 4, of
this report.
29 SI.Louis Federal Reserve Bank Review, January
1971, pp. 16-31. The quotation is from Keran's summary,
page 16.
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found between the general level of stock prices
and expectationsofinflation."Interestingly
enough, Keran's model determines the level
of stock prices by the level of the current ex-
pected real corporate earnings (estimated by a
5-year distributed lag) and another (additivel)
term for the long-term rate of interest.In the
actual fitting, however, this interest rate is re-
placed by its determinants, as developed in the
earlier St. Louis study3° of interest rates—spe-
cifically distributed lags of varying length on the
rates of change of the real money stock, real
output, and past inflation rates—and his con-
clusions on the adverse effects of expected
inflation on stock prices rest entirely on the
negative coefficient on the inflation rate in this
"reduced form" equation. Symmetry of treat-
ment to allow for the net effects of inflationary
expectations on expected earnings as well as
interest rates would have suggested entering
price expectations in an equation with current
nominal interest rates and current nominal nor-
malized earnings.31
Modigliani's more rigorous and sophisticated
study previously cited leads to substantially dif-
ferent conclusions. Since current cash dividend
payments were well estimated elsewhere in the
overall MIT—FRB model, the dependent variable
in the stock price equation was the current divi-
dend yield in the market. The resulting equation
was fitted to quarterly data for the seventeen
years 1953 through 1969.32 Highly significant
positive coefficients were found on a risk pre-
mium term (proxied by a 15-year moving aver-
age of the absolute deviations of unemployment
rates from a 4 per cent norm), and a significantly
negative coefficient was found on the current
"earnings cover" (E/D) of the dividend. Divi-
dend yields, also as expected, varied strongly
and very significantly with currently expected
long-term interest rates, estimated as a distrib-
uted lag over the current and previous four quar-
ter rates.
P. Yohe and D. S. Karnovsky, "Interest Rates and
Price Level Changes, 1952—69," St. Louis Federal Reserve
Bank Review, December 1969.
31This would have normalized the expected future real
returns to the current price level.
The equation had a standard error of estimate on divi-
dend yields of only fifteen basic points, with low residual
autocorrelation,But of more direct relevance here, currently
expected rates of inflation had a very significant
negative effect on dividend yields—the higher
the expected rate of inflation, the lower the divi-
dend yield, and hence the higher the stock price
for a given current dividend, assuming that risk
premium, earnings cover, and nominal interest
rates are the same. Moreover, the negative
coefficient estimated on price expectations is
larger in absolute terms than the positive pa-
rameter on the nominal interest rate. The fitted
equations therefore suggest that even if real in-
terest rates (nominal rates less price expecta-
tions) instead of nominal rates had been entered
directly in the equation, the ceteris paribus im-
pact of increased expectations of future price
increases would still reduce dividend yields (i.e.,
higher expected future inflation rates raise stock
prices).
For at least three reasons, however, this in-
ference must be drawn with caution from Modig-
liani's work. The absolute difference in the co-
efficients on nominal interest rates and price
expectations is less than the sum of the stand-
ard errors of the two estimates in each of his
fitted equations; the respective distributed lags
are five quarters for nominal rates but twelve
quarters for price expectations; and as noted
previously, at an early critical stage of his theo-
retical development, Modigliani builds on the
classical proposition that the market value at
current real price levels of unlevered securities
is independent of the expected rate of inflation.
But if this work does not justify any strong infer-
ence that greater expectations of inflation pro-
duce higher current stock prices, the good fits
produced at the least cast serious doubt on
Keran's contrary conclusion.
Finally, the Modigliani study justified no con-
clusions at all with respect to the effect of cur-
rent realized rates of inflation on stock prices
(as distinct from changes in expectations of fu-
ture inflation). To some extent, of course, more
serious current inflation raises expectations of
future inflation, but in the fitted equations this
effect is very minor, since the weights on recent
inflation in Modigliani's distributed lag are small
both absolutely arid relative to the dominant
weights found on price changes three to eight
quarters back. Of most direct relevance is the
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strong negative relation between dividend yields
and the ratio of current earnings to dividends.
Even waiving the potential biases in correlating
DIP with E/D, Modigliani simply used current
earnings as reported and for his purposes did
not need to examine the impact of current infla-
tion rates on stock prices. If we otherwise knew
that higher current rates of inflation reduce cur-
rent earnings, then his fitted equations would
imply higher dividend yields and lower stock
prices; on the other hand, if or when more cur-
rent inflation raises current earnings, his coef-
ficients imply that more current inflations would
raise stock prices. But these inferences that
stock prices move with current earnings are only
to be expected and are surely not novel. It re-
mains to examine the relations to be expected
between more or less inflation and the concur-
rent changes in corporate earnings and profits,
a matter we examine in some detail later.
The evidence reviewed to this point leads to
the following conclusions:
1. Cagan's work establishes that common
stocks have provided a hedge in the more ad-
vanced countries against all but very extreme
inflations in the long run in the sense that their
real returns are positive, but he did not under-
take any extensive analysis of the short-run or
intermediate term effects, nor did he attempt to
determine whether even the long-term positive
returns were larger or smaller because of infla-
tion than they would otherwise have been.
2, Keran's conclusion that greater expecta-
tions of future inflation depress stock prices was
based entirely on their adverse effects through
interest rates, and the form of the fitted equation
is likely to have biased the conclusion. Modig-
liani's work suggests better than even odds that
the net effect of expected future rates of inflation
on current stock market prices is no worse than
neutral, as the classical economists would have
expected. But his study focused on the other
issues, and this inference drawn from his equa-
tions would not pass standard tests of statistical
significance (even though all elements of his
equation did so for his own purposes).
3. These studies simply did not examine the
effects of current realized inflation (as distinct
from expectations of future inflation) on stock
prices, although the internal evidence of theseTABLE 1-12











1900 to 1966 (1971)
—6% to —37% 7(7) —25.9% (25.9) 7(7) 0(0)
—2to—5 8(8) +7.9 (7.9) 3(3) 5(5)
—1to +1 21(23) +15.5(14.9) 4(4) 17 (19)
+2to +5 14 (17) +8.9 (7.5) 4(6) 10 (11)
+6to +38 16 (16) +7.4 (7.4) 7(7) 9(9)
Average +2%(2.4%) 66 (71) Average+6.8%(6.6%) 25 (27) 41(44)
1946 to 1966 (1971)
—2% to—5% 2 —4.6%(4.6) 1(1) 1(1)











Source: See footnote in text. We have added data through 1971 in parentheses and recomputed the entire
table.
studies suggests that this issue turns essentially
on the impact of realized inflation on contempo-
rary corporate earnings.
The Short-Term Impact of Inflation
on Stock Prices as Shown
in Annual Data
In the mid-1960s, when "the Street" was most
bullish on purchases of common stocks as in-
flation hedges, Sydney Homer, a partnerin
Salomon Brothers and Hutzler, argued strongly
against the then common assumption that infla-
tion is good for common stocks.33 Using tabu-
lations of percentage changes in annual indexes
of wholesale prices and common stock prices
(see Table 1-12) Homer showed that in the 21
years between 1900 and 1966 when wholesale
prices were essentially stable, the average gain
in stock prices was 15 per cent, but that average
gains were reduced to 9 per cent in the 14 years
of moderate inflation (2 per cent—5 per cent) and
had averaged only 7 per cent (withcapital
losses in real terms) in the 16 years of more
serious inflation. When the years through 1971
are added, the average market gains in the 33
years of substantial inflation (over 2 per cent
See "Inflation and the Stock Market" an address
given before the Security Analysts of San Francisco, Janu-
ary 19, 1967.
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wholesale) are only about half the 15 per cent
average gain in the 23 years of essential stability
in general prices; within the last quarter-century,
the years of substantial inflation have shown
average market gains only about two-thirds as
large as those in years of price stability.
However, the stock price action in every group
of years in the table was quite variable. Indeed,
the within-cell standard deviation of changes in
stock prices in the 11 postwar years of negligible
inflation and in the 13 years of sizable inflation
were, respectively, 13.1 per cent and 15.9 per
cent. With so much unexplained variation in the
data, the differencein the average returnin
these groups of years (12.4 per cent—8.O per
cent) could very easily reflect no more than
chance variations in drawings from a universe
in which stock price changes were really inde-
pendent of changes in wholesale prices.34 Thus
the evidence that inflation is unfavorable to stock
prices is weak. The evidence against the hy-
pothesis that inflation is good for stock prices is
somewhat stronger, but still far from statistically
significant with such coarse groupings of the
Further confirmationisprovided by the non-para-
metric Mann—Whitney test of association. The rank sums
differ from their expected value in drawing from a random
ordering by less than one (.87) standard deviation. (For a
description of the Mann—whitney test see, for instance,
Irwin Miller and John E. Freund, Probability and Statistics
for Engineers, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1965,
pp. 214-217).data, however suggestive they may be. Clearly,
more refined regression analysis is required.35
1. When a simple regression between the an-
nual percentage change in stock prices and the
annual percentage change inthe wholesale
price index is run over the 70 years of data,
there is no correlation at all. (The R2 corrected
for degrees of freedom is in fact negative.) But
the results may be due to the indication shown
in the table that both serious deflation and seri-
ous inflation hurt common stock returns. The
deflation period would tend to produce a posi-
tive coefficient of the (negative) wholesale price
change; the inflation period wquld tend to pro-
duce a negative coefficient on the (positive)
inflation term—and the two effects may have
just been offsetting each other.
In order to test the possibility that both defla-
tion and serious inflation depress common stock
returns, we split the wholesale price series into
two separate variables. We defined W+ as the
actual percentage change in the wholesale price
index when it was algebraically greater than
—2 per cent, and a constant otherwise. Corre-
spondingly, W— was the actual amount of price
change when it was algebraically less (nega-
tively greater) than —2 per cent and a constant
otherwise. When these variables were entered
separately in a regression to explain stock price
changes, the fraction of variance in changes in
stock prices explained jumped to 13 per cent
and the deflation variable W was highly sig-
nificant (with a t-ratio of 3.62), showing that a
10 per cent deflation would reduce stock market
return by 15 per cent. The inflation term W+
was considerably weaker, with a submarginal
t-statistic of 1.44, and the regression coefficient
showed that a 10 per cent inflation would reduce
stock returns by only 4.1 per cent.
2. Earnings and interest rates, of course, also
affect stock prices.36 Indeed, a simple regres-
sion of percentage stock price changes (P) on
contemporary percentage earnings changes (E)
does about as well as our more refined tests of
Peter Fortune provided able assistance in carrying
through this econometric work.
36 Sinceourvariablesaredefinedaspercentage
changes,it was necessary to drop both 1921 and 1932
(which had negative earnings), and also 1922 and 1933,
from all the regressions involving the earnings variable.
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wholesale prices. Earnings alone explain 12 per
cent of the variance in P, and have an impres-
sive t-ratio of 3.35. In the simple correlation of
annual data, a 10 per cent increase in earnings
would increase stock prices 1 .8 per cent. More-
over, an extensive series of tests adding or sub-
stitutinglagged-earnings change, or moving
averages, did not significantly improve these
results.
3. We tested both commercial paper rates
(CP) and long-term bond rates (BR) in equa-
tions to explain stock prices. Rather surpris-
ingly, a simple regression on CP changes ex-
plained none of the stock price variance in these
regressions with annual data, nor did lags or
moving averages of this variable. Changes in
BR, however, explained 7 per cent of the vari-
ance in stock price change, with a significant t
of —2.67 and a simple regression coefficient,
implying that a 20 per cent increase in BR (e.g.,
from 4 per cent to 4.8 per cent) would reduce
stock prices by 15.3 per cent. Once again, lags
and moving averages added nothing to the ex-
planatory power of the long-bond rate in annual
data.
4. When allof these variables are entered
simultaneously in the regression, the following
results were obtained when, as in all the above,




— 0.669W+ — 0.542BR
—2.85 —2.09
— .341 — .257
All variables are significant and have the ex-
pected sign; and 33.4 per cent of the variance
of stock price changes is explained. Deflation
is the strongest variable when itis active; and,
in particular, a 5 per cent deflation would reduce
stock prices by 16.5 per cent, whereas a 5 per
cent inflation reducesthem by 3.35 per cent.
What is perhaps most significant in this equation
is that these strong deflationary impacts of in-
flation and deflation are net effects after allow-
This line gives the partial correlation coefficient of
each variable with the dependent variable.ing for their simultaneous effects on earnings
and long-term interest rates, which are also sta-
tisticatly significant variables in the equation.
5. As a final test, the last regression was rerun
simply over the 52 years in which wholesale
price changes were positive, with the following
outcome:
I = 10.10 + 0.1 1E—0.64W+ —0.6OBR
1.86 —2.48 —2.10
partial: .27 — .33 — .31
These results are very similar to those ob-
tained before with respect to each variable in-
cluded, and the value of each separate variable
continues to be significant at the 5 per cent
level. Although the regression as a whole re-
mains very significant,38 the powerful effect of
W— in years of severe deflation is no longer in-
cluded and the percentage of the variance of
stock price changes that is explained falls to
20 per cent. We also see that the Durbin—Watson
statistic39 indicates a significant degree of auto-
correlation in the residuals over the 52 years of
stable or rising prices. Although no lagged vari-
ables were significant when each variable was
introduced separately in our preliminary analy-
sis, we are testing for such lags in the full model
excluding years of deflation. We are also exam-
ining whether such other variables as commer-
cial paper rates, dividends, and growth rates
may also be significant factors in determining
percentage changes in average stock prices in
years of stable or increasing commodity prices.
Itis common practice to regard percentage
changes and logarithmic first-differences as in-
terchangeable in regression analysis, but study
of the data in logarithmic form permits more
flexibility and we are concurrently pursuing this
approach. One significant result we have con-
firms the appropriateness of concentrating on
the simple relative first-differences in the data.4°
The resulting regression over the 52 years of
36 The F-statistic is 5.55, far above the value (4.22) re-
quired for significance at the 1 per cent level.
The value has fallen from an acceptable level of 1.70
when deflation years were included to 1.30.
40 Specifically, when we regressed the levels of all vari-
ables in logarithmic form, we found the maximum likeli-
hood value of the cockran—orcutt adjustment parameter
to be 1.0, which reduces the data to first-differences in
the logarithms.
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stable or rising prices, •with the change in the





A comparison of this equation with the pre-
ceding one covering the same years shows
marked differences. The percentage of variance
of stock price changes explained is 16 per cent
(instead of 20 per cent), although the F-statistic
(4.69) is still very significant at the .01 level and
the standard error of estimate is .109 (instead of
.133). In addition, the Durbin—Watson statistic
again is respectable41 and shows no significant
autocorrelation (at the 5 per cent level) of the
residuals in our logarithmic equation. Even more
significant,the coefficient on the earnings-
changevariablehasmorethandoubled,
whereas that on "inflation" has fallen to less
than half its percentage-change value; and the
coefficient for the long-bond rate has fallen by
over two-thirds. The values of the respective
t-statistics have all changed in the same pro-
portions.
The correlation matrices in the two forms of
variable measurement suggest that the stronger
effect ofinflationinthe percentage-change
analysis primarily reflects the impact of a few
outlying observations,42 which in turn suggests
that some higher-order term in logarithmic infla-
tion may be more (or additionally) significant. We
are also testing for the effects of other variables
suggested by theory and previous empirical
work inthis logarithmic equation, but these
further results will have to be reported later.
Interpretations, Related Research,
and Further Work
The results of our work with annual data so far
indicate that the structure and conclusions of
Up to 1.64 from 1.3 in percentage-change form.
These 52 years of stable or rising prices included
10 years of inflation between 10 per cent and 38 per cent
and 29 years of stock price changes between 10 per cent
and 45 per cent;logarithm grows much less rapidly than
the percentage change. For instance, whenis .10,
is .0953; whenis .25, is .223; and whenis .45,
is .372, or about one sixth smaller.models used by both the classical and modern
neo-classical economists may be substantially
in error with respect to the relation between in-
flation and stock market prices. Assuming that
our further work with annual and quarterly mod-
els continues to support this conclusion, we
may appropriately consider some of the appar-
ent reasons for such a finding.
As we saw earlier, apart from allowance for
gains or losses from its net-debtor-creditor po-
sition, the classical conclusion that stock prices
would rise in proportion to other prices rested
essentially on the invariance toinflationof
(1) the real returns to the ownership of capital
goods, and (2) the real interest rate. There are
substantial reasons to doubt the validity of both
of these major premises, quite apart from the
impacts of important expectational considera-
tions ignored in the classical analysis, along
with the implications of the theories of portfolio
adjustment and multi-market equilibria that have
been developed more recently.
In any given year or quarter, the real returns
to the ownership of capital goods (a company's
real after-tax earnings plus interest charges)
will be invariant to inflation only if (1) its physical
output, (2) its real gross margin per unit of out-
put, and (3) the real after-tax value of its cap-
ital-consumption allowances are all unalfected
by inflation.43 Correspondingly, in a dynamic
growth context, these real returns will be invari-
ant to the current inflation rate only if the rate
of growth in real output and the gross and net
percentage profit margins are similarly unaf-
fected. But we must recognize that inflation is
not an exogenous force imposed on the "real"
elements of an economy, but rather is a highly
endogenous variable. The root cause of an in-
flationary "cycle" must be an increased demand
for goods and services arising from a stimulat-
ing shift in the fiscal (tax and public expendi-
ture) posture, or an easing of monetary policy,
or conceivably from a spontaneous surge in
private demands.
The initial acceleration and later deceleration
(or decline) in the rate of change in real output
We of course ignore the possibility of coincidentally
offsetting changes in these elements. Also, for simplicity
we will simply assume that the prices of variable inputs
other than wages are proportional to sales (output) prices.
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will obviously induce corresponding fluctuations
in earnings (and dividends with a lag), even if
gross and net (percentage) profit margins are
constant. But gross (and therefore net) margins
will not be constant. The work of Hultgren, Fab-
ricant, Kendrick, Kuh, and Eckstein and Wilson44
shows that the growth in productivity fluctuates
about its long-term trend in resonance with the
fluctuations in output growth. The resulting fluc-
tuations in gross margins produce still larger
fluctuationsinprofit, other things equal. But
other things are not invariant because prices
respond to changing demands and costs, and
wages respond to changing prices, labor mar-
ket tightness, induced expectations of further
inflation, and other factors.
Drawing on and adapting thesubstantial
amount of work over the last decade on the
determinants of industrial prices45 and wages,46
one important part of our continuing research
is a simulation (based on equations fitted to the
last 20 years of American data) of the fluctua-
tions in prices, wages, productivity, gross prof-
its margins, and rates of change in gross profits
that are implied by imposing different patterns
of accelerating (and later stable or falling) out-
put change on an economy otherwise in a non-
Thor Hultgren, Changes in Labor Cost During Cycles
of Production and Business, National BUreau of Economic
Research, New York,1960; Solomon Fabricant,Basic
Facts About Productivity Change,NationalBureauof
Economic Research, New York, 1959; John W. Kendrick,
Productivity Trends: Capital and Labor, National Bureau
of Economic Research, New York, 1956, and Productivity
Trends in the United States, National Bureau of Economic
Research, New York,1961; Edwin Kuh,Profits,Profit
Markups and Productivity, U. S. Congress, Joint Economic
Committee, 1960; Thomas A. Wilson and Otto Eckstein,
"Short-Run Productivity Behavior in U.S. Manufacturing,"
Review of Economics and Statistics (February 1964).
C. L. Schultze and J. L. Tryon, "Prices and Wages,"
Brookings Quarterly Econometric Model of the U.S., 1965;
Otto Eckstein and Gary Fromm, "The Price Equation,"
American Economic Review (December 1968); and the
papersinThe Econometrics of Price Determination, a
conference, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System,
1970 (published 1972).
See relevant papers in preceding footnotes; Edwin
Kuh, "A Productivity Theory of Wage Levels—An Alterna-
tive to the Phillips Curve," Review of Economic Studies
(October 1967); Otto Eckstein and Roger Brinner, The
Inflation Process in the U.S., U.S. Congress, Joint Eco-
nomic Committee, 1972; George L. Perry, "Changing Labor
Markets and Inflation," Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity,No, 3 (1970); Robert J.Gordon, "Inflationin
Recession and Recovery," Brookings Papers, No. 1 (1971);
"Wage-Price Controls and the Shifting Phillips Curve,"
Brookings Papers, No. 2 (1972); and his staff progress
report appearing later in this volume.inflationary, steady-state growth posture. The
results are showing that the gross returns to
capital initially are increased very substantially
in an inflationary "cycle" but they later stabilize
and then are sharply impaired for a considerable
period. At the moment, we need only empha-
size that the classical analysis of the effect of
inflation on stock prices was substantially in
error because all such fluctuations in gross re-
turns were ignored.
In addition, the classical premise that the total
returns to capital are invariant also requires that
the real after-tax value of capital consumption
allowances be unaffected by inflation. But even
it gross margins were to be constant,.as as-
sumed in the classical framework, and if the
prices of capital goods and product prices move
in tandem, net profit margins in real terms will
be impaired by increases in general price levels
when taxes have to be paid on nominal profits
after deducting depreciation on the basis of
original costs rather than current replacement
costs. Even in a long-run steady-stale, the clas-
sical premise of constant real returns to the
owners of capital goods has to be adjusted
downward to allow for the reduction in the real
value of the 'tax shield" for depreciation under
inflationary conditions. After corporate income
taxes reached high levels during World War II,
this matter began to receive extensive attention
in the literature47 and must surely be incorpo-
rated along with fluctuations in gross margins in
an. analysis of the effects of inflation on equity
values.
Recall that in our work with annual data we
have found a highly significant negative impact
of inflation on the percentage changes in stock
market prices, even after its effects on earnings
and interest rates have been allowed for—and
See especially E. Gary Brown, Effects of Taxation:
Depreciation Adlustments for Price Changes, Graduate
School of Business, Division of Research, Harvard Univer-
sity, Cambridge, 1952; and George Terborgh, Realistic
Depreciation Policy (1954), esp. Chapter 12; and Essays
on Inflation (1971), esp. Chapter 2, Machinery and Allied
Products Institute, Chicago. Also see Donald A. Nichols,
"A Note on Inflation and Common Stock Values," Journal
of Finance (September 1968); pp. 655-657; Brian Motley,
and Common Stock Values: Comment," Journal
of Finance (June 1969), pp. 530-535; and most recently,
James C. Van Home and William E. G!assmire, Jr., "The
Impact of unanticipated Changes in Inflation on the Value
of Common Stocks," Journal of Finance (December 1972),
pp. 1081 -1 092.
35
the odds are still about 9:1 that the net impact
of inflation is negative in the logarithmic form
tested. Allowance for the stream of discrepan-
cies between historical and replacement cost
depreciation under inflationary conditions for
tax purposes is surely one major factor that
would explain such a net depressing effect of
a well-established inflation on stock prices. But
this depressant is at least partially offset by
the favorable impact of the predominantly net-
debtor position of nonfinancial corporations, es-
pecially in recent years, and both ot these con-
siderations should be examined in more detail.
Recent research has shown that the classical
premise of a long-term real rate of interest in-
variant to the rate of inflation is an unwarranted
simplification.48 Also, the nominal rate is not
simply the real rate plus a premium equal to the
expected rate of inflation during all intervals or
periods when the Federal Reserve is pursuing
an active policy of either ease or tightness. In
addition, there has been growing public accept-
ance of the fact that restrictive fiscal and mone-
tary policy can effectively dampen the pace of
economic activity; and, based to some extent on
experience of the late fifties and especially on
1966 and 1969—70, there has been a growing
public expectation that monetary policy in par-
ticular (with at least some support from fiscal
policy) will in fact be used to cut back the vol-
ume of activity. Although tax rates, government
expenditures, and Federal Reserve actions are
usually treated as exogenous variables by econ-
omists, private expectations of these exogenous
responses to ongoing inflationary pressures
must surely be introduced into any fully satisfac-
tory analysis of the relation of inflation to equity
values.
See Thomas Sargent, "Commodity Price Expectations
and the Interest Rate," Quarterly Journal of Economics
(February 1969); and "Interest Rates and Prices in the
Long Run: A Study of the Gibson Paradox," for the Uni-
versities—National Bureau Conference on Secular Inflation,
published in the Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking,
Vol. V, No. 1, Part II (February 1973); and his papers sum-
marized in Part II, Section 4 in this report. Also, Milton
Friedman, 'Factors Affecting the Level of Interest Rates,"
1968 Conference Proceedings of the Conference on Sav-
ings and Residential Financing; William E. Gibson, "Price
Expectations Effects on Interest Rates," Journal of Finance
(March 1970); and Martin Feldsteiri and Otto Eckstein, "The
Fundamental Determinants of Interest Rates," Review of
Economics and Statistics (November 1970).Major developments in portfolio and capital
market theory in recent years show that the ad-
justments of market values to changing condi-
lions are much more subtle and complex than
suspected in earlier models.49 As part of our
continuingresearch, we aredevelopinga
broader portfolio adjustment model simulta-
neously including the stock market, bond mar-
ket, and short-term funds market. Among other
things, this work suggests that levels, first-dif-
ferences, and uncertainties regarding short-term
commercial paper rates, bond rates, and equity
yields, as well as expected inflation rates, be
included in the market clearing equations for
each interrelated sector. In particular, the in-
sights from these efforts and related work are
being incorporated in a new quarterly model of
the stock market. Consistent with the known ef-
ficiency and submartingale properties of the
market,5° this model cannot provide the basis
for any extraordinary risk-adjusted returns but
it will hopefully add significantly to our under-
See Section V in John Lintner, Finance and Capital
Markets, 50th Anniversary Colloquium II, National Bureau
of Economic Research, New York, 1972, and references
there cited.
SO Eugene F. Fame, 'Efficient Capital Markets: A Re-
view of Theory and Empirical Work," Journal of Finance
(May 1970).
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standing of the determinants of stock market
prices and returns, including specifically the ef-
fects of inflation and of inflationary expectations.
On the basis of this work and the other work
mentioned above, it would appear that our over-
all conclusions will finally be that both the un-
alloyed optimism of traditional economic theory
and the flat pessimism of the current version of
conventional wisdom are quite unjustified as
generalizations of the relation between inflation
and stock prices. In a non-inflationary setting,
equity values are likely to be enhanced (in both
nominal and real terms) quite significantly dur-
ing the earlier stages of an inflation; in other
circumstances and at other stages of a full
inflation "cycle," the effects will probably be
about neutral; arid in still other circumstances
the effects of more inflation on stock prices will
surely be adverse, and very severely so for a
time. But these projections of our probable con-
clusions will of course have to be confirmed by
the detailed results of our work still underway.